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LEARNING FROM BIOMETRIC DISTANCES: PERFORMANCE AND SECURITY
RELATED ISSUES IN FACE RECOGNITION SYSTEMS
Pranab Mohanty
ABSTRACT
We present a theory for constructing linear, black box approximations to face recognition algo-
rithms and empirically demonstrate that a surprisingly diverse set of face recognition approaches can
be approximated well using a linear model. The construction of the linear model to a face recog-
nition algorithm involves embedding of a training set of face images constrained by the distances
between them, as computed by the face recognition algorithm being approximated. We accomplish
this embedding by iterative majorization, initialized by classical multi-dimensional scaling (MDS).
We empirically demonstrate the adequacy of the linear model using six face recognition algorithms,
spanning both template based and feature based approaches on standard face recognition benchmarks
such as the Facial Recognition Technology (FERET) and Face Recognition Grand Challenge (FRGC)
data sets. The experimental results show that the average Error in Modeling for six algorithms is 6.3%
at 0.001 False Acceptance Rate (FAR), for FERET fafb probe set which contains maximum number
of subjects among all the probe sets. We demonstrate the usefulness of the linear model for algorithm
dependent indexing of face databases and find that it results in more than 20 times reduction in face
comparisons for Bayesian Intra/Extra-class person classifier (BAY), Elastic Bunch Graph Matching
algorithm (EBGM), and the commercial face recognition algorithms.
We also propose a novel paradigm to reconstruct face templates from match scores using the lin-
ear model and use the reconstructed templates to explore the security breach in a face recognition
system. We evaluate the proposed template reconstruction scheme using three, fundamentally differ-
ent, face recognition algorithms: Principal Component Analysis (PCA), Bayesian Intra/Extra-class
person classifier (BAY), and a feature based commercial algorithm. With an operational point set
vi
at 1% False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and 99% True Acceptance Rate (TAR) for 1196 enrollments
(FERET gallery), we show that at most 600 attempts (score computations) are required to achieve
73%, 72% and 100% chance of breaking in as a randomly chosen target subject for the commercial,
BAY and PCA based face recognition system, respectively. We also show that the proposed recon-
struction scheme has 47% more probability of breaking in as a randomly chosen target subject for the
commercial system as compared to a hill climbing approach with the same number of attempts.
vii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In the past few decades, research in biometric application has drawn a lot of attention from the
computer science community with much success. Initially, the focus has been centered on the de-
velopment of novel algorithms for biometric template matching techniques in various challenging
environment. Fusion of various biometric modalities is also a major topic of research to compen-
sate the performance of individual biometrics in non-cooperative environments. Recently, with the
cheaper biometric sensors and high accuracy of many biometric modalities, various advance yet prac-
tical research topics in biometric authentication systems have been proposed and discussed to a certain
length. Efficient storage and retrieval of biometric templates, fast and non-intrusive biometric sensors,
secure transmission of biometric templates over network, biometric system robustness against differ-
ent types of hacking mechanisms and user privacy are among several advanced topics in biometrics
applications. Due to the uniqueness of biometric templates and lack of re-issue ability of biometric
templates, template security and user privacy are the major hurdles in wide scale deployment of bio-
metrics sensors in real time applications and these advance topics play a significant role in biometric
applications. In this dissertation, we proposed a novel linear modeling mechanism to a biometric
authentication system and unveil the strength of such linear model to help indexing biometric tem-
plates, identifying possible threats to biometric systems and template reconstruction. A broad look at
biometrics related research is depicted in Fig. 1.1 along with the pointer to the contribution from this
dissertation in the related areas.
In this dissertation, we have used face images as a primary biometric modality and several face
recognition systems to demonstrate our ideas. But the theoretical finding of this dissertation can
be extended to other biometric modalities too. Among several biometrics, face images emerge as a
strong contender for biometric applications for various reasons, such as, low-cost deployment, public
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Figure 1.1 General Overview of Biometric Applications and Contribution from this Dissertation.
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acceptance and convenient enrollment procedures. Intensive research has produced an amazingly
diverse set of approaches for face recognition (see [23,25,70] for excellent reviews). The approaches
differ in terms of the features used, distance measures used, need for training, and matching methods.
Systematic and regular evaluations such as the FERET (Facial Recognition Technology) [40], FRGC
(Face Recognition Grand Challenge) [41] and Face Recognition Vendor Test [35] have enabled us
to identify the top performing approaches. In general, a face recognition algorithm is a module that
computes distance (or similarity) between two face images. Just as linear systems theory allows
us to characterize a system based on inputs and outputs, we seek to characterize a face recognition
algorithm based on the distances (the outputs) computed between two faces (the inputs). Can we
model the distances, di j, computed by any given face recognition algorithm, as a function of the given
face images, xi and xj (actually row-scanned vector representation of the images)? Mathematically,
what is the function φ so that the error (di j−||φ(xi)−φ(xj)||)2 is minimized? This problem is depicted
in Fig. 1.2.
(a)
(b)
Figure 1.2 Approximating Face Recognition Algorithms by Linear Models. Distance Between Two
Face Images Observed by (a) Original Face Recognition Algorithm (b) Linear Model.
Apart from sheer intellectual curiosity, answer to this question has some practical benefits. First,
it would let us have a better understanding of the algorithms than just the recognition rates. For in-
stance, if φ is an identity operator then it would suggest that the underlying face recognition algorithm
is essentially performing a rigid rotation and translation to the face representations similar to prin-
cipal component analysis (PCA). If φ is a linear operator, then it would suggest that the underlying
algorithms can be approximated fairly well by a linear transformation (rotation, shear, stretch) of the
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face representations. Second, if a linear approximation can be built then it can be used to reconstruct
face templates just from scores. We have demonstrated this ability in [33]. This has serious secu-
rity and privacy implications. Third, we can use the linear approximation to build efficient indexing
mechanisms for face images. This is particularly important for the identification scenarios where one
has to perform one to many matches, especially using a computationally expensive face recognition
algorithm. While there are efficient indexing mechanisms for fingerprints based on minutiae points,
such mechanisms are lacking for faces because there are no such global features for face images. A
possible fourth application could be the modeling of networked multi-biometric systems where the
linear model of the face recognition model can be used to construct closed-form analytical models.
Specifically, we consider φ’s that are affine transformations, defining a linear subspace spanned by,
possibly non-orthogonal vectors. To arrive at this model we need a set of face images (training set) and
the distances between these face images as computed by the face recognition algorithm. Thus, we treat
the algorithm as a black box. For computational reasons, we decompose the overall transformation
into two parts: a rigid transformation, which can be obtained by any orthogonal subspace finding algo-
rithm such as the principal component analysis, and a non-rigid, affine, transformation. Note that the
dimensions of the overall transformation need not be orthonormal. To construct the affine subspace
we embed the training set of face images constrained by the distances between them, as computed
by the face recognition algorithm being approximated. We accomplish this distance preserving em-
bedding by iterative majorization, initialized by classical multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) [13, 19].
This process results in a set of co-ordinates for the train images. The affine transformation defines
the relationship between these embedding co-ordinates and the rigid (PCA) space co-ordinates. We
analyze our proposed linear modeling scheme on some of the popular face recognition algorithms,
namely Eigenfaces (PCA + distance metrics) [58], Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) [7], Bayesian
Intra/Extra-class person classifier [31], Elastic Bunch Graph Matching (EBGM) [67], Independent
Component Analysis (ICA) [18] and one of the top performing commercial face recognition algo-
rithm. The choice of the face recognition algorithms includes template based approaches such as
PCA, LDA, ICA, BAY and feature based ones, such as the EGBM and a commercial algorithm. We
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use a subset of the FRGC [41] training set as our training set and test the quality of the approximation
on the FERET [40] and the FRGC [41] data set.
We use the proposed linear modeling scheme to perform the binning or algorithm specific index-
ing task with little overhead in computation. Of course, for algorithm such as PCA, LDA and ICA
which uses the linear projection of raw template the model will result in no additional computational
advantage. However, algorithms such as the BAY and EBGM, where numerical indexing of tem-
plate is not feasible, indexing through a linear model can reduce the overall computational complexity
by selecting only a subset of gallery images to be matched with probe image. With the help of the
proposed modeling scheme, we demonstrate that BAY algorithm requires at most 8 comparisons to
achieve similar rank-1 performance as compared to using complete probe set, which requires 1195
comparison in the case of fafb probe set. Similarly, for other two algorithms (EBGM and COM), at
most 50 comparisons are sufficient to achieve similar identification performance at 0.01% error rate
for rank-1 as well as rank-5 identification performances.
Using the proposed linear model approach to face recognition algorithm, we also unveil a possible
security and privacy breach in a face recognition system. We demonstrate that the discussed linear
model from match scores can be successfully used for face template reconstruction and eventually
make the system vulnerable to break in. Using the match scores between face images from a local
database, we build the corresponding affine transformation model of the face recognition algorithm.
It can be noted that the face recognition system is treated as a complete black box and we do not
perform any reverse engineering on the recognition system. The assumption of the knowledge of
the face recognition algorithm is a weak one. It might even be possible to identify the recognition
algorithm from the score matrices of known algorithms. The modeling of the recognition system
is an off-line procedure, and needs to be constructed only once for a given recognition algorithm.
Once we have built such a model, we present the templates from our break-in set to the system to
be broken and observe the match scores to an assumed identity. So, in real time scenarios, our pro-
posed method only requires access to a set of match scores, equal to the number of images in the
break-in set. These match scores are then used to embed the unknown target template in modeled
affine space. Finally, we use the inverse of the affine transformation to reconstruct the unknown target
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template in original image space. We validate our proposed template reconstruction scheme on three
different types of face recognition systems using two standard public databases, Facial Recognition
Technology (FERET) [40] and Face Recognition Grand Challenge (FRGC) [41]. Two template based
algorithms namely, principal component analysis with cosine distance measure [59] (widely accepted
as a baseline algorithm ) and Moghaddam and Pentland’s algorithm popularly known as the Bayesian
Intra/Extra-class person classifier (BAY) with maximum likelihood (ML) estimation [31], and a fea-
ture based commercial face recognition system are used for this experiment. A cursory look at match
scores from a biometric system may not appear to be a weak link in terms of security and privacy is-
sues; however, with our proposed we revealed that even match scores carry sufficient information for
reverse engineering of the original templates and should be protected in the same way as the original
templates.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we reviewed the existing work
related to approximate biometric system with linear model. We also discussed the existing approach to
index biometric templates and the inadequacy of such methods to index face templates. We presented
an extensive comparison of existing hill climbing approach with our proposed template reconstruction
method and briefly review the security and privacy issues in biometric authentication system. In
Chapter 3, we present our proposed linear modeling approach to face recognition algorithms along
with experimental setup and results. Chapter 4 discusses the indexing of face template using proposed
linear scheme. In Chapter 5 we present the details of face template reconstruction scheme followed by
a possible use of reconstructed templates to break into face recognition systems in Chapter 6. Chapter
7 concludes the dissertation with an elaborative discussion of future research direction related to the
findings of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
2.1 Linear Models for Biometric Algorithms
As far as we know, there is no direct related work that considers the face recognition algorithm
modeling problem as we have posed it. Perhaps the closest works are those that use multi-dimensional
scaling (MDS) to derive models for standard classifiers such as nearest neighborhood, linear discrim-
inant analysis, and linear programming problem from the dissimilarity scores between objects [38].
Pekalska et al. [38] propose a similar embedding scheme for the dissimilarity information of different
objects in the Euclidean/pseudo-Euclidean space depending on the presence/absence of the Euclidean
property of the original distance matrix and then unknown objects are projected to the embedded
space and classified accordingly with a Euclidean distance measure. A similar framework is also sug-
gested by Roth et al. [48], where pair-wise distance information is embedded in Euclidean space and
an equivalence is drawn between several clustering approaches with similar distance based learning
approaches.
There are also studies that statistically model similarity scores so as to predict the performance of
the algorithm on large data sets based on results on small data sets. For instance, recently Wang et
al. [64] proposed a novel approach to model and predict performance of a face recognition based on
analysis of similarity scores. Using similarity scores from gallery images only, the intrinsic parameters
associated with the recognition algorithms are optimized to find the best similarity scores between the
gallery images; these set of parameters are then used to predict the matching performance for query
images. Using the principal component analysis based face recognition algorithm with different dis-
tance measures, encouraging results have been reported with the FRGC and the FERET experiments.
Such approaches require extensive knowledge of the parameters of the underlying face recognition
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algorithms which, in certain cases, are difficult to access such as the commercial or proprietary algo-
rithms.
Mitra et al. [30] used the random effect model to predict the performance of a face recognition
system using the match scores from a small subset of the original data set. The match scores or an
monotonic transformation of the match scores between multiple templates of a subject are charac-
terized with random effect model along with variables associated with the face image. A Bayesian
estimation of these parameters is then incorporated to predict the set of parameters associated with
each subject. Using three different face recognition algorithms, authors reported that the equal error
rate for all three algorithms can be predicted accurately up to the first decimal place. Observing the
nature of the random effect model, one can infer that such approach requires a significant number of
face templates from each user in the training set to estimate the prior distribution of the parameters
as well as to compute conditional posterior of the unknown parameters using Gibbs sampling. Also,
due to the non-linearity nature of the proposed model along with the number of parameters needed to
be estimated for each individual, the computational cost of such model is directly proportional to the
number of subjects in the data sets.
Wang and Bhanu [65] proposed an expectation maximization (EM) based approach to predict the
performance of the face recognition system and find the smallest gallery set required for such models
to accurately predict the performance of a system. A similar approach was also presented in [24] to
build a model of cumulative match characteristic curve (CMC) from similarity scores.
Grother and Phillips [21] also proposed a joint density function to independently predict match
scores and non-match scores from a set of match scores. Apart from face recognition systems, similar
methods were also proposed to model and predict performances for other biometric modalities and
objects recognition [14, 26].
A couple of philosophical distinctions exists between our work and these related works. First,
unlike these works, which try to statistically model the scores, we estimate an analytical model that
characterizes the underlying face manifold and build a linear transformation from the original template
to this global manifold. Second, unlike some of these methods, we do not place any restrictions on
distribution of scores in the training set, such as separation between match score distribution and non-
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match score distribution. Third, we empirically demonstrate the quality of the model under a very
strict experimental framework with a complete separation of train and test.
2.2 Biometric Template Reconstruction and Its Impact on Security Issues
The increasing demands of biometric technologies can be well justified with its advantages over
password or smart card based technologies, such as user convenience, high security, and less fraud.
However, like many other authentication technologies, biometric based systems also possess vulnera-
ble points of security breaches in biometric based authentication systems [42]. The cost of replacing
a biometric token or template is higher when compared to that of a password or a smart card, with
severe security and privacy implications. The templates can be re-used over digital networks or can
be use to reproduce synthetic biometric templates such as fake fingers or model faces [23, 28]. In
case of face templates, there is an additional risk that the identity of a person using a biometric ac-
cess system in a highly secure facility can be revealed. Several authors have successfully pointed out
various sources of security breaches in biometric based authentication systems [22, 50]. Lately, some
counter-measures have also been proposed to nullify such threats [44,53,61] and standardized biomet-
ric application programming interface (BioAPI) has been continuously updated with counter-measure
guidelines such as, to encrypt templates, avoid storage and transmission of original templates, and
perform quantization of match scores [9]. Recently, cancelable biometrics have been proposed to
encrypt both gallery and probe templates in an attempt to restrict unauthorized access of biometric
templates [45]. Similarly, in [15], Boult proposed revocable biometrics with robust distance measure
where face templates are encrypted along with re-distribution of match scores within a pre-defined
range for each subject in the gallery set. These recent developments further indicate that, without
encryption of templates, biometric based authentication systems are vulnerable to security breaches
and privacy of the users.
In general, most biometric authentication systems have four major modules [10], a biometric
template acquisition sensor, a matching module to compare a new template to an enrolled template,
a decision module using pre-defined thresholds for particular operational points and a database for
enrolled templates (gallery). In many applications, it is not possible to integrate all these modules
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to one unit. In such scenarios, the information from one unit to the other is passed through digital
channels and/or stored in digital media for off-line processing. As reported by many authors [23, 44],
each of these modules possesses different level of security threats, and different counter measures
are necessary to nullify such threats. For instance, liveness detection at the sensor unit will detect
any attempts to hack the system with synthetic templates. Similarly, a secure database or a secure
digital channel will prevent any unauthorized access of templates over a network. In this paper, we
made a successful attempt to explore one such point of vulnerability between a matching module and
a decision module. In applications, where matching module and decision module are not integrated
together, we need to store the match scores in a digital media or transmit the match score through
digital channel to a decision module [34]. This scenario can arise in distributed network biometric
systems with a central decision unit. Such networks can arise in wide area monitoring contexts. In
this paper we pose the question: Can unauthorized access of these match scores result in security and
privacy breaches?
2.2.1 Hill Climbing Based Attacks
Soutar [52] was the first to propose an iterative template adaptation scheme, popularly known
as the hill climbing attack, to break into a biometric system based on match scores. The proposed
scheme attacks the account of a specific subject, referred to as the target, by starting from an arbitrary
face template and iteratively refining it. At every iteration, if the modified template results in a better
score than the previous match score then the modified template is retained or else it is discarded. The
process is iterated until the template is accepted as the target subject. The basic block diagram of the
hill climbing attack is shown in Fig. 2.1 (a). Note that with this method one might break into a system
using a final template that does not look like any face as long as it fools the system. In other words,
it is not a face reconstruction method but rather a break-in strategy. Though Soutar did not report any
quantitative results of biometric template reconstruction, good performance of similar approaches has
been reported by several others [1, 60].
One counter-measure for the first generation of hill climbing approaches is to quantize the scores.
With appropriate quantization it will not be possible to get incremental feedback as is needed by these
10
(a)
(b)
Figure 2.1 Schematic of Processes in (a) Hill Climbing Attack and (b) the Proposed Model Based
Approach. The Hill Climbing Attack is an Iterative Process that Starts From a Face Template and
Then Iteratively Updates the Template until an Accept Decision is Generated by the System. The
Proposed Approach is a Model Based, One-shot Method, Employing Multiple Face Templates – the
Break-in Set.
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approaches. So, Adler [1] proposed a modified hill climbing attack for a face recognition system with
quantized match scores using an additional independent set of Eigenfaces. The recognition systems
that output quantized match scores do not alter the match scores with small changes in input images,
which can prevent the first generation of hill climbing attacks. After initializing the process with an
arbitrary face template, at every iteration, the previously updated template is multiplied with randomly
selected Eigenfaces with different weights. This is expected to generate templates farther away from
the previous template. The face template which results in a better match score is retained as the
updated image for the next iteration. The process terminates when there is no further improvement in
match scores. Experimental results on a commercial face recognition algorithm show that after nearly
4000 attempts a high match score is achieved with 99% confidence. Later, Adler [2] extended this
idea to work with encrypted face templates.
Security breaches are possible not only for face biometrics but in other biometrics too. Uludag
and Jain [60] extended the hill climbing attack idea to break into minutiae based fingerprint recog-
nition algorithms. Initially, random minutiae templates are created and matched against the target
user by fingerprint matching system. The best matched template is then used to generate another set
of minutiae templates by randomly adding and deleting existing minutiae. The iteration process is
continued till the system accepts the template. The authors reported that all 160 enrolled accounts
could be broken with less than 1000 attempts for each account. Lopresti and Raim [27] proposed an
attack on an online handwriting recognition system by randomly generating feature vectors through a
generative model of human handwriting. A set of different text samples, from the enrolled users, were
fed to the generative model. With few text samples from the enrolled users, the model reproduced
different text templates thorough random partition and concatenation of the input text until a template
was accepted as a successful match. Preliminary results show that this attack succeeded 49% of the
time.
Although hill climbing based attacks can quite successfully break a particular target account, ef-
fective counter measures for such type of attacks can also be generated. One property of hill climbing
based attacks is that they require a large number of attempts before success. Hence, one possible
counter measure for such attacks is to restrict the number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts. How-
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ever, this still leaves the system vulnerable to a spy-ware based attack that interlaces its false attempts
with attempts by genuine users (successful attempts) and collects information to iterate over a period
of time. However, in most of the hill climbing based attacks, the templates at ith attempt (iteration)
are generated from the (i−1)th attempts (iterations) and are very similar to each other. Hence, if we
monitor all unsuccessful attempts for a particular target account within a fixed time interval, we will
discover a pattern of similar faces with decreasing dissimilarity scores (see Fig. 2.2). So, a continuous
observation of unsuccessful match scores will help to detect hill climbing based spyware attacks. In
this paper, we expose a more severe form of vulnerability where such counter measures will be hard
to design since we use scores from distinct face images, with no obvious patterns in the scores.
In Fig. 2.2, we present a schematic visualization of the search process to illustrate the differences
between a hill climbing attack and our proposed linear scheme. Our algorithm requires the distances
or scores between the target and a set of faces from break-in set that is distributed throughout the space.
While a hill climbing based attack computes scores for faces along a trajectory of incremental scores
from an arbitrary template to the target template, there are no obvious patterns in the scores needed
by our approach; hence, the proposed scheme is not incrementally iterative. As discussed earlier, the
statistically decreasing dissimilarity scores generated by a hill climbing based approach can indeed be
Figure 2.2 Visualization of the Search Process of a Hill Climbing Attack and the Proposed Model
Based Approach. The Dotted Line Represents One of the Possible Paths in a Hill Climbing Attack
Starting from a Chosen Template. At Each Point on the Path, Distance to the Template is Needed.
The Solid Arrow Represents One Time Comparison of Target Template with Members of Break-in
Set Templates that is Needed by The Proposed Approach.
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used to detect such attacks, but a similar strategy can not be applied to our proposed method. The hill
climbing approach is considered as a break-in strategy to a recognition system whereas the proposed
method is a template reconstruction scheme for any face recognition system. In our case, the break-in
performance shows the accuracy and confidence in reconstructed templates. As a result, the proposed
algorithm has vulnerability implications related to both security and privacy issues of the users. Also,
the numbers of attempts in our break-in scheme are pre-defined by the number of images in the
break-in set which allows such attacks to be more feasible in real time applications. In Chapter 6,
we present a more systematic evaluation of our proposed method against hill climbing based attacks
showing the efficiency of our method both qualitatively in terms of reconstructed templates as well as
quantitatively in terms of the probability of breaking into a recognition system.
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CHAPTER 3
MODELING FACE RECOGNITION ALGORITHMS
In order to model a particular algorithm from its outputs, we need to learn the underlying distri-
bution of face images, also known as manifold of face images, as induced by the specific algorithm.
We also need a transformation to project new face images into the learned manifold. In this Chapter,
we present the mathematical derivation of the proposed affine transformation based modeling scheme
for this manifold. Given a set of face images and the pair-wise distances between these images, first
we compute a point configuration preserving these pair-wise distances between projected points on
the low dimensional manifold. We use stress minimization with iterative majorization to arrive at a
point configuration from match scores between templates on the training set. Although the iterative
majorization algorithm is guaranteed to converge with any starting point, an informative initial guess
will reduce the number of iterations and speed up the process. We use classical multi-dimensional
scaling for this purpose.
3.1 Derivation of the Linear Model
Notations: A few notational issues are in order. Let di j be the distance between two images, xi
and xj (row-scanned vector representations), (xTi ∈ ℜN ) as computed by the given face recognition
algorithm. Here we assume that the face recognition algorithm outputs the dissimilarity scores of
two templates. However, if a recognition algorithm computes similarities instead of distances, we
can always convert the similarity scores si j into distances using a variety of transformations, such as
(1− si j), − log(si j), or 1si j − 1. These distances can be arranged as a K×K matrix D = [d
2
i j], where
K is the number of images in the training set. In this paper, we will denote matrices by bold capital
letters, A, column vectors by bold small letters, a. We will denote the identity matrix by I, a vector of
15
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ones by 1, a vector of zeros by 0, and the transpose of A by AT. For each image, we would like to find
vectors yi such that ||yi−yj||= f (di j), where f (.) is a monotonic function and yiT ∈ ℜM M ≤ M.
3.1.1 Computing Point Configuration
The objective is to find a point configuration Y = [y1,y2, · · · ,yK] such that the squared error in
distances ∑(di j −δi j)2 is minimum where di j is the distance computed between face template Xi and
Xj and δi j is the Euclidean distance between configuration points yi and yj. The objective function
can be written as
minimize ∑
i≤ j
wi j(di j−δi j)2 (3.1)
where, wi j are weights chosen appropriately. The incorporation of weights wi j in Eqn. 3.1 is a gen-
eralization of the objective function and can be associated with the confidence in the match scores if
computed by any algorithm. The weights can also be useful when there are few missing match scores,
in which case, the weights for those entries can made to be zero. If there are no confidence values
associated with the similarity scores, then all the weights can be the same. In our experiments, the
weights are all equal and set to 1. For generality, we develop the theory based on weighted scores.
Let,
S(Y) = ∑
i< j
wi j(di j−δi j)2
= ∑
i< j
wi jd2i j + ∑
i< j
wi jδ2i j−2∑
i< j
wi jdi jδi j
= η2d +η2(Y)−2ρ(Y) (3.2)
where, η2d is independent of the point configuration Y and
η2(Y) = ∑
i< j
wi j(yi− y j)T (yi− y j)
= tr(YTVY) (3.3)
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where,
vi j = −wi j for i 6= j (3.4)
vii =
n
∑
j=1, j 6=i
wi j. (3.5)
Similarly,
ρ(Y) = ∑
i< j
wi jdi j
δi j
δ2i j
= ∑
i< j
wi jdi j
δi j
(yi− y j)T (yi− y j)
= tr(YTU(Y)Y) (3.6)
where, [U(Y)] = [ui j] and
ui j =


−wi jdi j
δi j if δi j 6= 0 and i 6= j
0 otherwise
uii =


∑ j=1, j 6=i −wi jdi jδi j if δi j 6= 0
0 otherwise
Hence, from Eqn. 3.2,
S(Y) = η2d + tr(YTVY)−2tr(YTU(Y)Y) (3.7)
The configuration points Y can be found by maximizing S(Y) in many different ways. In this
work, we consider the iterative majorization algorithm proposed by Borg and Groenen [13]. Let,
T(Y,Z) = η2d + tr(YTVY)−2tr(YTU(Z)Z) (3.8)
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then T ≥ S and T(Y,Y) = S(Y), hence T(Y,Z) majorizes S(Y). So the optimal set of configuration
points Y can be found as follows
δT
δX = 0
2VY−2U(Z)Z = 0
(3.9)
Hence, the iterative formula to arrive at the optimal configuration points can be written as follows
Y(k) = V†U(Y(k−1))Y(k−1) (3.10)
where, Y(0) is initialized to some random configuration points and V† represent the pseudo-inverse of
V.
3.1.2 Choice of Initial Point Configuration
Although the iterative solution presented in Eqn. 3.10 can be initialized with any random starting
configuration point, an appropriate guess will reduce the number of iteration to find optimal configura-
tion points. We initialize the iterative algorithm with a set of configuration points derived by applying
classical multi-dimensional scaling on the original distance matrix. Classical multi-dimensional scal-
ing works well when the distance measure is a metric or more specifically an Euclidean distance
matrix. Therefore, we first compute an approximate Euclidean distance DE from the original distance
matrix D followed by the derivation of initial configuration points using classical multi-dimensional
scaling adapted from Cox and Cox [19].
Given the original distance matrix D, we first check if the distance matrix satisfies Euclidean
distance properties. If any such property is violated, then we replace the original distance matrix
D with an equivalent distance matrix DE . The term equivalent is used in the sense that, the overall
objective of both the distance matrix D and DE remains the same. For example, in our case, adding
a constant to all the entries of original distance matrix DE does not alter the overall performance of a
face recognition system and hence, has similar behavior in terms of recognition performances.
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Although there are several possible approaches to verify the Euclidean property of a given distance
matrix [37], we utilize the following theorem proposed by Gower and Legendre [20] to check the
Euclidean property.
Theorem 3.1.1 A distance matrix D is Euclidean if and only if B = − 12 HD2H is a symmetric and
positive semi-definite metric, where H is the centering matrix.
If the original distance matrix D is not Euclidean, as in case of most of the face recognition
algorithms, then we use the following propositions to derive an equivalent Euclidean distance matrix
DE from D. In lieu of biometric applications, we assume that distance between the same template is
zero and all the distances are positive, as negative distances can be shifted to another interval ensuring
the positive property without affecting the overall performances. Therefore the possibility of the
distance matrix D not satisfying Euclidean property can arise mainly from two factors. Either D is
not a positive semi-definite matrix and/or D does not satisfy triangle inequality. In such scenarios, the
following propositions are useful to restore the triangle inequality and positive semi-definite property
in the equivalent matrix DE . A detail discussion on deriving equivalent Euclidean distance DE can
also be found in our earlier work [33].
Proposition 3.1.2 If D is non-metric then the matrix [δrs+c],(r 6= s) is metric where c≥maxi, j,k |δi j +
δik−δ jk|.
Theorem 3.1.3 If D is a metric distance, then there exists a constant h such that the matrix with
elements (d2i j +h)
1
2 , i 6= j is Euclidean, where h≥−2λn is the smallest (negative) eigenvalue of HDH,
where H = (I− 1K 11
T ). [19, 20]
The steps involved to modify the original distance and to verify the Euclidean property of D is
outlined in Fig. 3.2. This step also provides additional information about the dimension of the model
space as well as the distance measure to be used in model space. If the original distance measure is
verified to be Euclidean, then we use Euclidean distance measure in the model space; for all other
distance measures, we use the dot product distance in our model space.
20
Figure 3.2 Steps to Compute Initial Configuration Points Y (0). First, We Verify the Euclidean Property
of the Original Distance Matrix d and then Compute an Equivalent Euclidean Distance Matrix de, If
Necessary. The Dimension of the Model Space is also Determined during this Process.
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Figure 3.3 From Distance Metric to Points in Model Space. We Use Classical MDS to Compute
Configuration Points from Distance Matrix DE .
3.1.3 Classical Multi-dimensional Scaling
Given the equivalent Euclidean distance matrix DE, the objective is to find K vectors, {y1, · · · ,yK}
such that
DE(i, j) = (yi−yj)T (yi−yj) (3.11)
Note that the above configuration points yi’s are not unique. Any translation or rotation of vectors yi’s
can also be a solution to Eqn. 5.1 (See Fig. 3.3). To reduce such degrees of freedom of the solution
set, we constrain the solution set of vectors to be centered at the origin and the sum of the vectors to
zero, i.e. ∑i yi = 0. Eqn. 5.1 can be compactly represented in matrix form as
DE = c ·1T +1 · cT −2YT Y (3.12)
where Y is matrix constructed using the vectors yi as the columns Y = [y1, · · · ,yK] and c is a column
vector of the magnitudes of the vectors yi’s. Thus
c = [y1T y1, · · · ,yKT yK]T (3.13)
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To simplify Eqn. 3.12, if we pre- and post-multiple each side of the equation by centering matrix
H = (I− 1K 11
T ), we have
B =−
1
2
HDEH = YT Y (3.14)
Since DE is Euclidean matrix, the matrix B is also a distance matrix, representing dot product distances
between the vectors, yi, and is a symmetric, positive semi-definite matrix [13, 19]. Thus the initial
configuration points can be derived as
Y(0) = (VMEVD∆
M
EVD
1
2 )T (3.15)
where ∆MEVD is a M×M diagonal matrix consisting of M non-zero eigenvalues of B and VMEVD repre-
sents the corresponding eigenvectors of B.
3.1.4 Affine Transformation
So far, we have seen how to find a set of co-ordinates, Y, such that the Euclidean distance between
these co-ordinates is related to the distances computed by the recognition algorithm by an additive
constant. We now find an affine transformation, A, that will relate these co-ordinates, Y, to the
images, X, such that
Y = A(X−µ) (3.16)
where µ is the mean of the images in break-in set, i.e. average face. We do not restrict this transforma-
tion to be orthonormal or rigid. We consider A to be composed of two sub-transformations: non-rigid
transformation Anr and rigid transformation rigid, Ar, i.e., A = AnrAr. The rigid part Ar can be ar-
rived at by any analysis that computes an orthonormal subspace from the given set of training images.
In this experiment, we use the principal component analysis (PCA) for the rigid transformation. Let
the PCA co-ordinates corresponding to the non-zero eigenvalues, i.e. non-null subspace, be denoted
by Xr = Ar(X− µ). The non-rigid transformation, Anr, relates these rigid co-ordinates, Xr to the
distance based co-ordinates, Y.
Y = AnrXr (3.17)
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Substituting Eqn. 5.3 in Eqn. 3.17 we have
AnrXr = (VMEVD ∆
M
EVD
1
2 )T (3.18)
Multiplying both sides of Eqn. 3.18 by XrT and using the result that XrXrT = ΛPCA, where ΛPCA is
the diagonal matrix with the non-zero eigenvalues computed by PCA, we have
Anr = (VMEVD ∆
M
EVD
1
2 )T XrT ΛPCA−1 (3.19)
This non-rigid transformation allows for shear and stress, and the rigid transformation, computed
by principal component analysis, together model the face recognition algorithm. Note that the rigid
transformation is not dependent on the face recognition algorithm; it is only the non-rigid part that is
determined by the distances computed by the recognition algorithm. An alternative viewpoint could
be that the non-rigid transformation captures the difference between a PCA based recognition strategy
– the baseline – and the given face recognition algorithm.
Thus the overall outline of modeling approach can be summarized as follows.
• Input:
– A training set containing K face images.
– The distance matrix ’D’ computed on the training using the face recognition algorithm.
• Algorithm:
– Compute initial configuration points Y (0) (See Fig. 3.2).
– Use the iterative scheme in Eqn. 3.10 to arrive at the final configuration points. The
iteration is terminated when the error S(Y ) is less than the tolerance parameter ε which is
empirically set to 0.001 in our experiments.
– Compute the rigid sub-transformation Ar using PCA on training set.
– Compute the non-rigid sub-transformation Anr
– A = ArAnr is the required model affine transformation.
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We evaluate the accuracy of the proposed linear modeling scheme using six fundamentally dif-
ferent face recognition algorithms and compare recognition performances of each of these algorithms
with respective models. We demonstrate the consistency of modeling scheme on two standard face
data sets (FERET and FRGC). In the following subsections, we provide more details about the face
recognition algorithms and the distance measures associated with these algorithms, train and test sets
used in our experiments, and the metrics used to evaluate the strength of the purposed modeling
scheme.
3.2 Experimental Setup
Experimental results, presented in this section, validate that the proposed linear modeling scheme
generalizes to a different probe set representing different variations in face images (FERET probe
sets) and consistent with performances of face recognition algorithms on large scale data sets (FRGC
Experiments) as well. We demonstrate that, different distance measures with PCA algorithm, and
normalization of match scores, have minimal impact on the proposed modeling approach.
3.2.1 Data Sets
For our experiments, we use two popular face image data sets namely, the Facial Recognition
Technology (FERET) data set [40] and the Face Recognition Grand Challenge (FRGC) data set [41].
These two data sets are publicly available and equipped with pre-defined training, gallery and probe
sets commonly used to evaluate face recognition algorithms. The FERET data set contains the maxi-
mum number of distinct subjects in the gallery set (1196) and the FRGC data set contains maximum
number of face images (16028 from 466 subjects). All the face images used in this experiment, except
for EBGM algorithm, were normalized using the Colorado State University (CSU) Face Identification
Evaluation System [8] to have the same eye location, the same size (150 x 130) and similar intensity
distribution. Few normalized face images are shown in Fig. 3.4. The EBGM algorithm requires a
special normalization process for face images which are also available in [8].
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Figure 3.4 Sample Face Images. Top Row Represents Sample Training Images from the FRGC Train-
ing Set. Middle Row Represents Sample Gallery Images from the FERET Data Set and Bottom Row
Represents Sample Probe Images with Different Variations.
3.2.2 Face Recognition Algorithms and Distance Transformation
We evaluate our proposed modeling scheme on four different template based algorithms and two
feature based face recognition algorithms. The template based approaches include Principal Compo-
nent Analysis (PCA), Independent Component Analysis (ICA), Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA),
and Bayesian Intra/Extra-class person classifier (BAY). A commercial algorithm (COM) and Elastic
Bunch Graph Matching (EBGM) algorithm are selected to represent the feature based recognition al-
gorithms. In this section, we briefly described these algorithms and the respective distance measures
used by these algorithms. For further details on these algorithms, the readers may refer to the original
papers or recent surveys on face recognition algorithms [23, 25, 70].
Face recognition based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [58] of face images is one of the
most popular algorithms and also considered as a baseline algorithm for face recognition system. The
algorithms projects both the probe and gallery images to a lower dimensional space using a set of basis
images popularly known as Eigenfaces, computed from a set of training images. The distance between
probe and gallery image is then computed in the projected space to measure the dissimilarity between
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two faces. In this experiment, we use Mahalanobis cosine distance measure as this particular measure
has reportedly better performance when compared to other distance measures [39, 62]. A variation of
PCA algorithm is the Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) [7] algorithm which also projects both the
target and probe images into a lower dimensional space followed by the distance measure between
the two projected images. The dimensions are reduced by computing within class scatter against
between class scatter and finding their generalized eigenvectors and eigenvalues subject to maximum
discrimination between class scatters. Euclidean distance is then used to compute the dissimilarities
of projected face images.
Algorithms based on PCA of face images assume each image as a random variable with Gaussian
distribution and compute the Eigenfaces based on second order statistics. This assumption is relaxed
in algorithms based on Independent Component Analysis (ICA) [18] of face images. ICA based al-
gorithms computes second order as well as higher order of statistics of face images to find statistically
independent basis vectors not necessarily orthogonal to each other. Bartlett et al. [6] provided two
different architectures for the ICA based face recognition algorithm. However, since both architec-
tures have similar performances, in this experiment we only use Architecture-I with cosine angle as
the distance measure.
The Bayesian algorithm [31] proposed by Moghaddam and Pentland uses the difference between
two images to probabilistically determine similarity of two faces. Difference images arising from the
images of the same subject are called intra-personal images and difference images arising from the
images of two different subjects is called as extra-personal images. Each of these difference images
is considered to be a point in a high dimensional space. The high dimensional space is however very
sparsely populated as majority of the vacant spaces correspond to difference images that never occur
in practice. These difference images will tend to form clusters with underlying assumption that each
difference image belongs to one of the two interpersonal and extra personal clusters. Also that they
are distinct and localized Gaussian distributions within the space of all possible images. However
the parameters to these distributions are unknown. These parameters can be estimated by using the
maximum a posteriori method or the maximum likelihood method. In our experiment, we restrict
ourselves to only the Maximum Likelihood (ML) method since it has been found to have equally good
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results as the maximum a posteriori method and at the same time it is less computationally intensive.
The maximum likelihood estimate ignores the extra-personal class information. When comparing a
novel image to ‘N’ known gallery images, the gallery image yielding the highest similarity score is
taken as to be the person in the probe image.
Elastic Bunch Graph Matching algorithm [67] differs from the other algorithms because it rec-
ognizes faces by comparing parts, instead of performing matching the image as whole. The features
of the images are represented by Gabor jets also called as model jets, obtained by convolving an
image with a Gabor filters. These model jets are collectively called bunch graphs and each node in
this graph is a collection of model jets of a particular landmark. These jets have been extracted from
manually selected landmark locations from the model images and adding to the appropriate bunch
graphs, used as reference data for landmark descriptions while locating landmarks in novel images.
Locating a landmark is based on two steps. The location is first estimated by the known location of
other landmarks in the image and estimated location is then further refined by extracting a Gabor jet
at that point and comparing it against a set of models. The most similar jet is selected from a bunch
graph and this then serves as a model. The algorithm begins by estimating the eye co-ordinates first
because these estimates are very reliable and then iteratively try to locate the rest of the landmarks till
it has reached the edge of the head. Face graphs are created for each image by extracting jets from the
landmark locations like eyes, nose tip, corner of lips, etc. These graphs contain the physical location
of the landmarks as well as the value of the jets. Jets are also extracted from locations at the midpoint
between two landmarks. Since an image is now represented only by its face graph, the original im-
age data can be discarded and an immense amount of memory can be saved. Similarity between two
images is calculated as a function of the landmark locations and their jet values. Jet similarity can
be computed using various methods of magnitude only, phase or displacement compensated Gabor
jet similarity. Another method to compute the similarity is based on the position of the landmark
points. A simple way is to compute the Euclidean distance between these locations. The presumption
being that images belonging to the same subject will differ very little in the landmark locations. Since
in EBGM algorithms, the landmark points are computed manually, we used the FERET training set
where landmark points are already defined, to train our proposed model for EBGM algorithm.
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For this experiment, we also include a high performing feature based commercial algorithm. It
uses Local Feature Analysis (LFA) to represent the face. The mathematical technique of LFA assumes
that a facial image can be synthesized from an irreducible set of building elements. These elements can
be derived from a set of model face images using statistical techniques. For identification purposes the
relative positions of these elements are as important as the characteristics of the elements themselves.
Although several elements are possible, only a few are needed to describe a face completely. However
these elements do not necessarily correspond to facial features even though they span just a few pixels.
Compared to methods such as the PCA, LFA is much more resilient to changes in expression and
hence much more robust. The information about distance measure used in the commercial algorithm
is unknown. Note that, in this experiment, we do not use the in-built face detection module, instead,
we use normalized face images with fixed size and fixed eye co-ordinates. We also use the raw
match scores from the commercial system without any in-built score normalization routines. Table
3.1 summarizes the distance measures used for the different algorithm.
The six face recognition algorithms and the distance measures associated with each of these al-
gorithms are summarized in Table 3.1. Except for the commercial algorithm and ICA algorithm,
the implementation of all other algorithms are publicly available in Colorado State University (CSU)
Face Identification Evaluation System [8]. The implementation of ICA algorithm has been adapted
from [5]. The particular distance measures for each of these algorithms are selected due to their higher
recognition rates compared to other distance measures.
The last two columns in Table 3.1 indicate the range of the similarity/dismiliarity scores of the
respective algorithms and the transformation used to convert these scores to a range such that the lower
range of all the transformed distances are same i.e. the distance between two similar face images
are close to 0. Although the distance measure for the Bayesian Intra/Extra-class person classifier
(BAY) is a probability measure but due to the numerical challenges associated with small probability
values, the distances are computed as an approximation to such probability. The implementation
details of distance measures for BAY algorithm and EBGM algorithm can be found in [55] and [11]
respectively. Also, in addition to above transformations, the distance between two exact image is set
to zero in order to to maintain the reflexive property of the distance measure. All the above mentioned
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distance measures also exhibit symmetric property hence no further transformation is required to
enforce the symmetric property of the distance measure. Note that, these distance transformations are
monotonic increasing functions and hence do not alter the relative similarity/dissimilarity between
two face images. So the recognition performance of the respective algorithms with transformed scores
remain same to the recognition performance with original scores.
3.2.3 Train and Test Sets
Out of six selected algorithms, except commercial algorithm, the other five algorithms require a
set face image as part of the algorithm training process. This training set is different from the training
set required to model the individual algorithms. Thus to distinguish between these two training sets,
we define two training sets; algorithm train set (algo-train) and a model train set (model-train). We
use a set of 600 controlled images from 150 subjects (in the decreasing order of their numeric id)
from the FRGC training set to train the individual algorithm. To build the linear model for each algo-
rithm, we use another subset of the FRGC training set with 600 controlled images from the first 150
subjects (in the increasing order of their numeric id) with four images per subjects. Due to limited
number of subjects in the FRGC training set, few subjects appear in both the training set; however,
there is no common image in algo-train and model-train set. Also, the feature based EBGM algorithm
differs from other algorithms with a special normalization and localization process of face images
and requires manual landmark points on training images. Hence for the EBGM algorithm, we use
the FERET training set containing 493 images provided in CSU face evaluation system including
the special normalized images required for EBGM algorithm. The algo-train and the model-train for
EBGM algorithm are same. The commercial system does not require any training images. However,
while building the model for the commercial system, we empirically observe that the performance of
the linear model demonstrate higher accuracy on the FERET probe sets when the model is trained
on the FERET training set. Similarly, the linear model is more accurate on the FRGC experiments
when the number of images in model-train for commercial system is expanded to 2048 images, con-
taining an equal number of controlled and uncontrolled images from the FRGC training set. In the
result section, we have demonstrated the performance of our linear model to the commercial system
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with these two different model-train sets. For test sets, to be consistent with other studies, we have
selected the gallery set and four different probe sets as defined in the FERET data set. The gallery set
contains 1196 face images of 1196 subjects with neutral or minimal facial expression and with frontal
illumination. Four sets of probe images (fb, fc, dupI, dupII) are created to verify the recognition
performance under four different variations of face images. The ‘fb’ set contains 1195 images from
1195 subjects with different facial expression than gallery images. The ‘fc’ set contains 194 images
from 194 subjects with different illumination conditions. Both ‘fb’ and ‘fc’ images are captured at the
same time as that of gallery images. However, 722 images from 243 subjects in the probe set ‘dupI’
are captured between in between 0 to 1031 days after the gallery images were captured. Probe set
‘dupII’ is a subset of probe set ‘dupI’ containing 234 images from 75 subjects which were captured
at least one and a half year after gallery images. The above mentioned numbers of images in probe
and gallery sets are pre-defined within the FERET distribution. Similar to the FERET evaluation
protocols, the Face Recognition Grand Challenge (FRGC) is designed to evaluate face recognition
algorithms on large data set with more challenging conditions. Several experiments are designed in
the FRGC framework; out of which Experiment one, Experiment two, and Experiment four involve
intensity images in both gallery and probe sets. Experiment one and two is designed to study the
performance of any face recognition algorithm where both target and query images are captured in
controlled illumination conditions. Experiment four is designed to study the effect of illumination
variation on recognition algorithms with a target set containing controlled images whereas query set
contains uncontrolled images. The target set for all three experiments is the same and contains 16028
normalized images. The query sets of Experiment one and two are the same as the target set whereas
the query set for Experiment four contains 8016 uncontrolled images. In Experiment two, the match
scores from same subjects are further sub-sampled which results in a better performance for most of
the face recognition algorithms. This is the only difference between the first two experiments of the
FRGC [41]. We evaluate our proposed modeling scheme using the FRGC pre-defined target set and
query set of Experiment one, two and Experiment four using the commercial system.
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3.2.4 Performance Metrics for the Linear Model
We compare the recognition rates of the algorithms with recognition rates of the linear models
in terms of standard Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC). Given the context of biometrics, this
is a more appropriate performance measure than the error in individual distances. How close is the
performance of the linear model to that of the actual algorithm on image sets that are different from
the train set? We augment this performance measure with a measure that reflects the local manifold
structure that is captured by the linear model. We define a new metric Nearest Neighbor Agreement
that capture the agreement in the identity of the nearest neighbor for each probe between the original
algorithm and its linear model.
While comparison of ROC curves of the original algorithm with that of the model demonstrate
the strength of the linear model, the metric (Error in Modeling) quantifies the accuracy of the model
at a particular False Acceptance Rate (FAR). We compute the Error in the Modeling by comparing
the True Positive Rate (TPR) of the linear model with the TPR of the original algorithm at a particular
False Positive Rate (FAR).
Error in Modeling (%) = abs(T PRorig−T PRmodel)
max(T PRorig,T PRmodel)
×100 (3.20)
where, T PRorig and T PRmodel are the true positive rate of the original algorithm and true positive rate
of the model at a particular FAR.
In order to closely examine our proposed model, we also define a stronger metric, Nearest Neigh-
bor Agreement, to quantify the local neighborhood similarity of face images in model transformation
with the original algorithm. For a given probe Pk, let Gi be the nearest subject as computed by the
algorithm and G j be the nearest subject based on the linear model. Let,
sk(Gi,G j) =


1 if i = j
0 otherwise
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Then the Nearest Neighbor Agreement between the model and the original algorithms can be
quantified as
S = ( 1
P
P
∑
k=1
sk)×100
where P is the total number of probes in the probe set. Note that the Nearest Neighbor Agreement
metric S is a stronger metric than rank-1 identification rate in Cumulative Match Curves (CMCs).
Two algorithms can have the same rank-1 identification but the Nearest Neighbor Agreement can be
low. For the latter to be high, the identities of both the correct and incorrect matches should agree. In
other words, a high value of this measure indicates that the model and the original algorithm agree on
neighborhood structure of the face manifold.
3.3 Modeling Results
In this section, we present experimental results of our proposed linear models to six different face
recognition algorithms using the FERET probe sets. We also model the commercial algorithm on the
FRGC experiment one, two and four. Using the metrics defined in previous section, we demonstrate
the strength of the linear model on two different data sets and with complete separation of training and
test sets. The Experimental results show that the average Error in Modeling for six algorithms is 6.3%
for fafb probe set which contains a maximum number of subjects among all the four probe sets. We
also observe that the proposed linear model exhibits an average of 87% accuracy when measured for
the similar neighborhood relationship with the original algorithm. A detailed analysis and explanation
of these results are presented in the following subsections.
3.3.1 Model Space
In order to visualize the difference between different algorithms and the underlying lower dimen-
sional face space constructed by individual algorithms, in Fig 3.5 we present the top four dimensions
of the affine space for each of the algorithms. In the top row, we present the first four dimensions
of the Eigenfaces computed from the training set followed by the first four dimensions of the model
space for individual algorithms. Note that, the dimensions of the Eigenfaces and model space of
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Algorithm Dimension 1 Dimension 2 Dimension 3 Dimension 4 Total Dim.
Eigenfaces 360
PCA 360
LDA 149
ICA 70
BAY 599
EBGM 480
COM 485
Figure 3.5 Top Four Dimensions of Corresponding Affine Spaces for Each Algorithm. For A Com-
parison with Eigenfaces (Rigid Transformation), In Row One We Present First Four Dimensions of
the Eigenfaces Followed by PCA, LDA, ICA, BAY, EBGM And COM Algorithm Respectively. The
Last Column Indicates the Total Dimension of the Respective Model Space.
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PCA algorithm are different. This indicates that the model space is also motivated by the underlying
distance measure rather than the rigid transformation of faces. The distance measure used for PCA
algorithm is cosine distance in Mahalanobis space (see definition of MahaCosine distance in [8]);
as a result the non-rigid transformation for PCA algorithm is not an identity transformation, conse-
quently, the Eigenfaces and that of the model space for the PCA algorithm are different. Note that,
if we use Euclidean distance in place of MahaCosine distance for PCA algorithm then the non-rigid
transformation for the PCA algorithm will be an identity matrix and the model space will be equal to
the eigenspace. From Fig 3.5, we also observe that each recognition algorithm emphasizes different
variations in corresponding dimensions compared to other algorithms. However, there are notable
resemblances between variations captured by different template based algorithms (PCA, LDA, ICA
and BAY) though not in same order. For example, variations captured through first dimension of PCA
are similar to that of fourth dimension of ICA; similarly variations captured in the fourth dimension
of LDA and BAY are similar.
The last column in Fig 3.5 indicates the total dimension of the model space for the respective
algorithms. In most of the dimension reduction techniques the choice of dimension of the projected
space plays an important role towards overall performance, yet there is no direct solution to find the
perfect dimension of the projected space. In practice, the eigen-spectrum of the original data provides
an approximation to the dimension of the projected space. However, as shown in other studies [37],
even ignoring few larger eigenvalues also yields better results. In the presence of negative eigenvalues
with high magnitude, Pekalaska and Duin [37] suggested a new embedding scheme of the data points
in pseudo-Euclidean space whose dimension is decided by both positive and negative eigenvalues
of high magnitudes. However, since in our case, we have modified the original distance matrix,
when necessary, to enforce the Euclidean property, we do not have a large magnitude of negative
eigenvalues of the modified distance matrix. So the dimension of the affine space is decided in a
more conventional way of neglecting smaller eigenvalues and keeping 99% of the energy of eigen-
spectrum. In Fig 3.6, we plot the Eigenvalues of the matrix B. For LDA based algorithm, the original
distance matrix is tested to be Euclidean and hence no correction measure for metric property is
necessary and Euclidean distance measure is used in affine space to model the algorithm. Similarly,
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for ICA algorithm, magnitude of negative Eigenvalues are very small compare to largest positive
Eigenvalues, hence the dimension of the affine space is decided by dropping the negative Eigenvalues
however since the original distance matrix is not Euclidean so we use cosine angle distance in affine
space to approximate the algorithm. For all other algorithms, the magnitude of negative Eigenvalues
is large compare to highest positive Eigenvalues hence we enforce the metric property and positive
semi-definite property by adding appropriate constant to non-diagonal elements of respective distance
matrix and use cosine angle distance in affine space to model each algorithms.
3.3.2 Recognition Performances
In Figs. 3.7 to Fig. 3.12, we compare the original performances of all six algorithms with the
performances of respective linear models. The four different probe sets are pre-defined in the FERET
database. Note the log-scale for the false alarm rate. We observe that not only the recognition perfor-
mance of the model matches with that of the original algorithm but it also generalizes to the variations
in face images represented by four different probe sets. For example, the performance of ICA algo-
rithm in fafc (Fig. 3.9(b)) is lower as compared to rest of the algorithm and the modeling performance
is also lower for ICA algorithm which is a good indication of accurate model of the underlying algo-
rithm. Similar performances can also be observed in case of LDA and BAY algorithms.
Also, for fafb probe set, the error in the modeling of all the algorithms at 0.001 FAR are 3.8%, 7%,
9%, 5%, 4% and 26% for PCA, LDA, ICA, BAY, EBGM and COM algorithms, respectively. The high
error rate for the COM algorithm indicates that the linear model for COM algorithm is under-trained.
Note that, the training set used for the commercial system or the score normalization techniques
adapted to optimize the performances are unknown. However, we observe that the commercial sys-
tem’s performance is very high for the various FERET experiments but similar performance can not
be duplicated on the FRGC experiments. So, we re-train our linear model for the COM algorithm
with the FERET training set containing 493 images and also study the effect of two standard score
normalization methods on the proposed linear model for the commercial system. The performance of
the COM system on four FERET probe set and the performance of the linear model trained using the
FERET training set are presented in Fig 3.13. With the FERET training set, the Error in Modeling for
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Figure 3.6 Eigenvalues of Distance Matrix for Each Algorithm. (a) PCA with MahaCosine Distance
(b) LDA with Euclidean Distance (c) ICA on Arch I (d) BAY Algorithm (e) EBGM Algorithm (f)
Commercial Face Recognition System.
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Figure 3.7 ROC Curves: Comparison of Recognition Performance of PCA Algorithm with the Cor-
responding Linear Model. (a) FERET-fafb (b) FERET-fafc (c) FERET-dupI (d) FERET-dupII Probe
Set with FERET Gallery Set.
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(a) fafb (b) fafc
(c) dupI (d) dupII
Figure 3.8 ROC Curves: Comparison of Recognition Performance of LDA Algorithm with the Cor-
responding Linear Model. (a) FERET-fafb (b) FERET-fafc (c) FERET-dupI (d) FERET-dupII Probe
Set with FERET Gallery Set.
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Figure 3.9 ROC Curves: Comparison of Recognition Performance of ICA Algorithm with the Cor-
responding Linear Model. (a) FERET-fafb (b) FERET-fafc (c) FERET-dupI (d) FERET-dupII Probe
Set with FERET Gallery Set.
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Figure 3.10 ROC Curves: Comparison of Recognition Performance of BAY Algorithm with the Cor-
responding Linear Model. (a) FERET-fafb (b) FERET-fafc (c) FERET-dupI (d) FERET-dupII Probe
Set with FERET Gallery Set.
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Figure 3.11 ROC Curves: Comparison of Recognition Performance of EBGM Algorithm with the
Corresponding Linear Model. (a) FERET-fafb (b) FERET-fafc (c) FERET-dupI (d) FERET-dupII
Probe Set with FERET Gallery Set.
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(a) fafb (b) fafc
(c) dupI (d) dupII
Figure 3.12 ROC Curves: Comparison of Recognition Performance of COM with the Corresponding
Linear Model. (a) FERET-fafb (b) FERET-fafc (c) FERET-dupI (d) FERET-dupII Probe Set with
FERET Gallery Set.
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COM algorithm in fafb probe set is reduced to 13%, and with the normalization process, the Error in
Modeling for the commercial system is further reduced to 9%. The effect of score normalization on
proposed modeling scheme is discussed in Section 3.3.4.
(a) fafb (b) fafc
(c) dupI (d) dupII
Figure 3.13 ROC Curves: Comparison of Recognition Performance of COM with the Corresponding
Linear Model. (a) FERET-fafb (b) FERET-fafc (c) FERET-dupI (d) FERET-dupII Probe Set with
FERET Gallery Set. The Linear Model is Trained Using 493 FERET Training Images.
In Fig. 3.14, we compare the performance of the commercial algorithm (blue color lines) with that
of the linear model on the FRGC experiments (red color lines). As mentioned earlier, the training set
to model the commercial system has been expanded to 2048 images from the FRGC training set to in-
clude an equal number of controlled and uncontrolled images. Following the guidelines of the FRGC
distribution, we plot three ROC curves for the original algorithm as well as for the model. These
three ROC curves: ROC-I, ROC-II, and ROC-III, represent the temporal variation among probe and
gallery images. ROC-I represents performance on target and query images captured within a semester.
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Figure 3.14 Comparison of Recognition Performances on the FRGC Experiments with the Corre-
sponding Linear Model. (a) Commercial Algorithm on Experiment One (b) Commercial Algorithm
on Experiment Two (c) Commercial Algorithm on Experiment Four.
47
Similarly ROC-II and ROC-III represent performance between semester and within the year, respec-
tively [41]. The comparison of performance as presented in Fig 3.14 reinforces the high quality of
the built model. For Experiment one, the proposed linear model not only matches the performance of
commercial system but also the temporal variations as observed in three different ROC’s do not affect
the model. In our earlier work [32], we have observed similar patterns of encouraging results for
template based algorithms (LDA and PCA). Considering the ROC-III has the higher temporal varia-
tion, the Error in Modeling for Experiment one and Experiment two for ROC-III for the commercial
algorithm are 4%, 3%, respectively. The performance of the commercial system is too low for the Ex-
periment four to compute the modeling error. Due to the poor performance of the commercial system
on Experiment four, it is not feasible to properly evaluate the Error in Modeling for this experiment.
For Experiment four, the linear model demonstrates a higher performance compared to the commer-
cial system. Such behavior of the linear model is not totally unexpected. We believe the commercial
system is not tuned to controlled-uncontrolled illumination variation in face images. And we can
not re-train the commercial to include such variations. As a result, the face manifold created by the
commercial system on Experiment four is not very robust/stable. Therefore, the non-rigid transfor-
mation could not have significant impact on the rigid space and, the performance of linear model of
the commercial system more resembles towards the baseline (PCA + MahaCosine) algorithm than the
commercial algorithm. In the next section, we will discuss more about the local manifold structure of
the model through the Nearest Neighbor Agreement metric.
3.3.3 Local Manifold Structure
Fig. 3.15 shows the similarity of the neighborhood relationship for six different algorithms on the
FERET fafb probe set. Observe that, irrespective of correct or incorrect match, the Nearest Neighbor
Agreement metric has an average accuracy of 87% on all the six algorithms. It is also important to
note that, for algorithms where the performance of the model is better than that of the original algo-
rithm, the metric S is penalized for such improvement in the performances and pulls down the subject
agreement values even if the model has better performance than the original algorithm. Nonetheless,
the high value of such a stringent metric validates the strength of the linear model. Even with little
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Figure 3.15 Similarity of the Local Manifold Structure Between the Original Algorithm and the Linear
Model as Captured by the Nearest Neighbor Agreement Metric using the FERET fafb Probe Set.
information about the train and optimization process of commercial algorithms, the linear model still
exhibits a 70% accuracy for the commercial algorithm. As we observe from Fig. 3.12 and Fig. 3.14,
the commercial system might be optimized for the FERET type data sets and may have used some
score normalization techniques before transforming the match scores to a fixed interval [a b]. In the
next subsection we explore the variation in the model’s performance with different distance measures
using PCA algorithm as well as the effect of score normalization on our proposed modeling scheme
using the commercial system.
3.3.4 Effect of Distance Measures and Score Normalization
Different face recognition algorithms use different distance measures, and in many cases the dis-
tance measure is unknown and non-Euclidean in nature. In order to study the effect of various distance
measure on proposed modeling scheme, we use PCA algorithm with 6 different distance measure other
than Mahacosine distance. For a stronger comparison we kept all other parameters, such as the train-
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ing set and dimension of the PCA space, same as before. Only the distance measures are changed.
These distance measures are implemented in the CSU Face Evaluation Tool, and we use them as per
the definition in [8]. In Table 3.3, we present the Error in Modeling (see Eqn. 3.20) for the PCA
algorithm with different distance measures on the FERET fafb probe set. Note that, as described in
Fig 3.2, except for PCA+Euclidean distance, the model uses cosine distance for all other cases. From
the table, we observe that for different distance measures, the Error in Modeling is in the magnitude
of 10−2 or less. Therefore, it is apparent that different distance measure have minimal impact on the
proposed modeling scheme.
Table 3.3 Effect of Distance Measure on the Model: Error in Modeling for PCA Algorithm on the
FERET fafb (1195 subjects) Probe Set.
Distance Measure False Acceptance Rate (%)0.001 0.01 0.1
CityBlock 0.022 0.018 0.007
Euclidean 0.003 0.0001 0.0001
Correlation 0.004 0.015 0.0005
Covariation 0.003 0.016 0.0002
L1 Norm 0.024 0.003 0.005
L2 Norm 0.008 0.006 0.0001
Biometric match scores are often augmented with some normalization procedures before com-
pelled to a threshold based decision. Most of these score normalization techniques are often carried
out as a post processing routine and do affect the underlying manifold of the faces as observed by the
face recognition algorithms. The most standard score normalization techniques used in biometric ap-
plications are Z-normalization and Min-Max normalization. To observe the impact of normalization
on proposed modeling scheme, we use the commercial algorithm with Min-Max and Z-normalization
techniques. Note that, in this case, the normalization techniques are considered as part of the black
box; hence the match scores used to train the model are also normalized in the similar way. Fig 3.16
shows the comparison of recognition performance of commercial system with score normalization to
that of modeling. The score normalization is a post-processing method and does not reflect the origi-
nal manifold of the face images; so in the presence of such normalization, the model actually predicts
the original scores instead of normalized match scores.
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Figure 3.16 ROC Curves Indicating Score Normalization Effect on Proposed Modeling Scheme. (a)
Min-Max Normalization (b) Z-normalization Techniques on the FERET fafb Probe Set.
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Hence, we apply the same score normalization techniques to match scores of the model and plot
it for a better comparison. As expected, the proposed modeling scheme emphasizes the underline
manifold of the face images irrespective of any post processing such as normalization of the match
scores. However, the difference between the algorithm with normalized match score and the model
with the same normalization of match scores is minimum.
3.4 Discussion
We proposed a novel, linear modeling scheme for different face recognition algorithms based on
the match scores. Starting with a distance matrix representing the pair-wise match scores between
face images, we used an iterative stress minimization algorithm to obtain an embedding of distance
matrix in a low dimensional space. We then proposed a novel linear out-of-sample projection scheme
for test images. The linear transformation used to project new face images into the model space is
divided into two sub transformation: a rigid transformation of face images obtained through principal
component analysis of face images followed by a non-rigid transformation responsible for preserving
pair-wise distance relationships between face images. To validate the proposed modeling scheme,
we used six fundamentally different face recognition algorithms, covering both template based and
feature based approaches, on four different probe sets using the FERET face image database. We
compared the recognition rate of each of the algorithms with respective model and demonstrated that
the recognition rates are consistent on each of the probe set. Experimental results showed that the
proposed linear modeling scheme generalized to different probe set representing different variations
in face images (FERET probe sets) and consistent with performances of face recognition algorithms
on large scale data sets (FRGC Experiments). A 6.3% average Error in Modeling for six algorithms
is observed at 0.001 False Acceptance Rate (FAR), for the FERET fafb probe set which contains
maximum number of subjects among all the probe sets. Similarly, for the FRGC experiment one and
two, we observed an average of 3.5% Error in Modeling for the commercial algorithm at 0.001 FAR.
The proposed linear model also exhibited an average of 87% accuracy when measured for the similar
neighborhood relationship with the original algorithms. Although choice of distance measure varies
from algorithm to algorithm, we showed that such variations in distance measures have less impact on
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our proposed modeling scheme. Similarly, many biometric systems use score normalization as a post
processing routine, and we observed that similar score normalization routine when applied to match
scores obtained through the affine model of the algorithm yields expected recognition performances.
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CHAPTER 4
INDEXING FACE TEMPLATES
In the identification scenario, one has to perform one to many matches to identify a new face image
(query) among a set of gallery images. In such scenarios, the query image needs to be compared to
all the images in gallery. So the response time of the system is directly proportional to the gallery
size. The entire process is computationally expensive for large gallery sets. One possible approach to
avoid such expensive computation and to provide faster response time is to index or bin the gallery set.
In case of well developed biometrics such as fingerprints, a binning process based on ridge patterns
such as whorl loop and arches is used for indexing [17, 46]. For other biometrics where a template
is represented by a set of d-dimensional numeric features, Mhatre et al. [29] proposed a pyramid
indexing technique to index the database. Unfortunately, for face images there is no straightforward
and global solution to binning or indexing of face images. Since different algorithms use different
strategies to compute the template or features from face images, such indexing strategy can not be
independent of underlying algorithms. For example, the Bayesian intra/extra class approach computes
the difference image of probe with all the gallery templates, so a feature based indexing scheme is not
applicable for this algorithm.
4.1 Indexing with Linear Model
We can use the proposed linear modeling scheme to perform the binning or algorithm specific in-
dexing task with little overhead in computation. Of course, for algorithms such as PCA, LDA and ICA
which use the linear projection of raw templates, the model will result in no additional computational
advantage. However, algorithms such the Bayesian and EBGM, where numerical indexing of tem-
plate is not feasible, indexing through a linear model can reduce the overall computational complexity
by selecting only a subset of gallery images to be matched with probe images.
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For a given face recognition algorithm, we design the corresponding linear model as described
in Chapter 3. We then project a given probe image into the model space of the face recognition
algorithm and find the K nearest gallery images. We use the original algorithm to match K-selected
gallery images with the probe image and output the rank of the probe image. A graphical comparison
of the face identification system with and without indexing scheme is outlined in Fig 4.1. Note that,
for a perfect model, a system with indexing and without indexing will produce the same rank for any
probe set.
(a)
(b)
Figure 4.1 Outline of Indexing Approach. (a) Face Identification System without Indexing (b) Face
Identification System with Indexing Through Linear Model.
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4.2 Experimental Setup
To evaluate the proposed indexing mechanism, we select the FERET gallery with the FERET fafb
and dupI probe set. These are the two probe sets containing maximum number of distinct subjects.
The training of the individual face recognition algorithms are same as described earlier in Chapter 3.
In order to quantify the error in the indexing scheme, we use the difference in rank values for a
given probe set with and without the indexing scheme. If the model extracts the same K nearest gallery
image as by the original algorithm, then the rank of a particular probe will not change with the use of
the indexing procedure and identification rate at a particular rank will remain same. However, if the
K-nearest gallery subjects selected by the model do not match with the K nearest subjects selected by
the original algorithm, then identification rate at a particular rank will decrease. To quantify the error
in indexing, let Ir represents the identification rate of algorithm at rank r, without using the indexing
of gallery set and ˜Ir(K) represents the identification rate of algorithm at rank r, using the indexing
scheme. We compute the error in indexing scheme as follows
Er =
max(Ir− ˜Ir(K),0)
Ir
(4.1)
Where Er represents the error in indexing approach at rank r. Note that, if a probe image has rank
higher than K then we penalize the indexing scheme by setting the rank ˜Ir(K) to 0. Hence ensuring
highest possible value of Er. The maximum is taken to avoid penalizing the indexing scheme in
cases where indexing of gallery images yields better identification rate than the original algorithm;
for example, in the case where model of an algorithm has a better recognition rate with modeling than
the original algorithm.
Hence, from Eqn. 4.1, it is obvious that there is a trade off between the value of K, which is
directly proportional to the response time of the system , and the error tolerance due to the indexing
scheme. A higher value of K will ensure higher accuracy in the rank through indexing of face template
but increase the number of template matching required by the algorithm. In Fig 4.2 and Fig 4.3, we
plot the error in indexing versus the indexing parameter K using both fafb and dup1 probe set at rank-1
and rank-5 for BAY, EBGM and COM algorithm, respectively. As we can observe, from Fig. 4.2 (a),
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for BAY algorithm, all the subjects with rank-1 has correctly identified by setting the value of K to 1.
However, for subjects with rank-5 on fafb probe set, the value of K need to set to 12 to nullify any
error due to indexing mechanism. Similar trend for value of K is also observed for BAY algorithm on
dupI probe set too. Hence, we conclude that for BAY algorithm, the value of K can be set to 12, to
achieve the similar identification rate as per the original algorithm. However, for other two algorithm
the value of K is observed to be close to 50 to achieve the best performance from the indexing scheme.
4.3 Results
Table 4.1 Indexing Error Table: Value of K at Three Different Indexing Error Rates for Rank 1 (Rank
5) Identification Rate on the FERET fafb (1195 Subjects) Probe Set.
Algorithm Error in Indexing0.1 0.01 0.001 0.0001
BAY 1 (5) 1 (7) 1 (12) 1 (12)
EBGM 1 (5) 9 (15) 43 (43) 48 (48)
COM 1 (5) 18 (22) 46 (46) 50 (50)
Table 4.2 Indexing Error Table: Value of K at Three Different Indexing Error Rates for Rank 1 (Rank
5) Identification Rate on the FERET dup1 (722 Subjects) Probe Set.
Algorithm Error in Indexing0.1 0.01 0.001 0.0001
BAY 1 (5) 1 (5) 1 (9) 8 (13)
EBGM 1 (5) 15 (15) 20 (22) 20 (22)
COM 1 (5) 22 (38) 22 (50) 26 (50)
In Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, we show the specific values of the indexing parameter K at three
different indexing error rates for rank-1 and rank-5 identification, using both fafb and dup1 probe set,
respectively. These two table shows that, if we allow a small error tolerance for indexing approach,
then the number of comparison to find the rank of a particular probe image reduces significantly.
For example, for the Bayesian algorithm, the value of the indexing parameter is as low as 8 with
error in indexing equals to 0.01%. Which means, with the help of the proposed model, the Bayesian
algorithm requires at most eight comparison to achieve similar rank-1 performance as compared to
using complete probe set, which requires 1195 comparison in the case of fafb probe set. Similarly,
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Figure 4.2 Indexing Trade-Off on the FERET-fafb set with Rank-1 and Rank-5.
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Figure 4.3 Indexing Trade-Off on the FERET-dup1 set with Rank-1 and Rank-5.
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for the other two algorithms, at most 50 comparison is sufficient to achieve similar identification
performance at 0.01% error rate for rank-1 as well as rank-5 identification performances.
4.4 Discussion
In this Chapter, we have demonstrated a very useful application of our earlier proposed linear
modeling scheme. We proposed an indexing mechanism for face templates with the help of a linear
model to computationally expensive face recognition algorithm. Unlike other biometric modalities,
face templates do not have common global feature sets to use for binning the templates. Since we
use the linear model of the algorithm, hence our approach of indexing face templates is algorithm
specific. Nonetheless, with more than 1000 unique face templates, we experimentally showed that the
proposed indexing scheme results in more than 20 times reduction in face comparisons for Bayesian,
EBGM, and the commercial face recognition algorithms. With this indexing scheme, the response
time is reduced by a factor of CaCm +
K
N , where Ca and Cm is the time required to match two face images
using original algorithm and its linear model respectively. N represent the number of gallery images.
Since, our proposed modeling scheme is a linear projection of face images, hence in most cases (such
as BAY and EBGM algorithms) Ca ≥Cm therefore the CaCm + KN << 1. However, for algorithms such
as PCA, LDA and ICA which uses the linear projection of raw template, the model will not result in
computational advantage as in these cases Ca = Cm.
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CHAPTER 5
FACE TEMPLATE RECONSTRUCTION
Biometrics templates such as fingerprints, face or voice are very unique physical characteristics of
an individual person. This uniqueness property of the biometric templates is a major motivation to use
biometrics in authentication and security systems. However, the uniqueness of biometric templates
also has a draw back in terms of stolen templates. Unlike password or smartened based authentication
system, biometrics templates are very difficult to regenerate. Hence, secured storage and encryption
of digital biometric templates is very important. Even the original templates are encrypted or stored
in a secured database, unauthorized re-construction of biometric template can pose a security and
privacy threat to the biometric system. In the following two Chapters, we discuss and identify a
possible security breach to face recognition system from template match score. On the surface, match
scores from a biometric system may not appear to be a weak link in terms of security and privacy
issues. However in the following two Chapters, we reveal that even match scores carries sufficient
information for reconstruction of the original templates and should be protected in the same way
as original templates. Therefore guidelines such as encryption of match scores, limited number of
attempts within a fixed time interval, periodical updates of enrolled templates should be incorporated
with every installation of biometric authentication system.
With the proposed linear model, we demonstrate that face templates can indeed be reconstructed
from match scores using a non-iterative process. Once we successfully built a linear model (see
Chapter 3) to a face recognition system, using a novel distance based embedding technique, we embed
the target face in the model space. Then, we use the inverse of the linear model transformation
on the target face in model space to reconstruct the face in original face image space. Recall that,
while constructing the linear model to face recognition algorithm, we seek an approximating affine
transformation A that is a composition of an orthogonal (or rigid) and a non-rigid (shear and stretch)
61
transformation, A = AnrAr. The approximating affine transformation preserves the distances among
the templates generated by the face recognition system. Given this affine space, we can embed any
template in this space based on its distance d from a known set of templates – the set of break-in
templates. Once we have the embedded affine co-ordinates for template yz, we can reconstruct the
face by inverting the affine transformation. A graphical outline of the template reconstruction process
is presented in Fig. 5.1.
Figure 5.1 Outline of Face Template Reconstruction Process.
We build the affine transformation model A of the face recognition algorithm using a local set of
face images (break-in set). This break-in set is independent from the gallery and probe sets. It can be
noted that the face recognition system is treated as a complete black box and we do not perform any
reverse engineering on the recognition system. The assumption of the knowledge of the face recog-
nition algorithm is a weak one. (It might even be possible to identify the recognition algorithm given
score matrices of known algorithms. However, we do not explore that angle here.) The modeling
of the recognition system is an off-line procedure, and needs to be constructed only once for a given
recognition algorithm. Once we have built such a model, we present the templates from our break-in
set to the system to be broken and observe the match scores to an assumed identity. So, in real time
scenarios, our proposed method only requires access to a set of match scores, equal to the number
of images in the break-in set. These match scores are then used to embed the unknown template of
a targeted subject in modeled affine space. Finally, we use the inverse of the affine transformation
to reconstruct the unknown template of a targeted subject in original image space. We validate our
proposed template reconstruction scheme on three different type of face recognition systems using
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two standard public databases, FERET [40] and FRGC [41]. Two template based algorithms namely,
Principal Component Analysis with cosine distance measure [59] (widely accepted as a baseline al-
gorithm) and Moghaddam and Pentland’s Bayesian Intra/Extra-class person classifier (BAY) with
Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation [31], and a feature based commercial face recognition system
are used for this experiment.
5.1 Affine Transformation From Match Scores
Similar to modeling scheme described in Chapter 3, with same mathematical notation, let di j be
the distance between two images, xi and xj, (xTi ∈ ℜN ) in break-in set as computed by the given face
recognition algorithm. Here we also assume that the face recognition algorithm outputs the dissimi-
larity scores of two templates. However, if a recognition algorithm computes similarities instead of
distances, we can always convert the similarity scores si j into distances using a variety of transforma-
tions, such as (1− si j), − log(si j), 1si j −1 etc. Then, these distances can be arranged as a K×K matrix
D = [d2i j], where K is the number of images in the breaking set.
For biometric systems, if the original match score between two templates is not modified based
on other templates on the gallery, then a monotonically increasing transformation of the distances
does not affect the model of the system. For many recognition algorithms the underlying distance
measure may not be Euclidean and in some case the observed dissimilarity matrix may not exhibit
metric properties as well. In such cases, we need to transform the distance matrix D to equivalent
Euclidean distance matrix DE. Although the process of converting a non-Euclidean distance matrix to
an equivalent Euclidean distance matrix is not feasible in all cases, an approximation to non-Euclidean
distance matrix D can be used for such embedding [38].
Although many different schemes [49, 56] can be used to arrive at a set of configuration points
which preserve the pair-wise distances given by a input distance matrix, for this experiment, we
followed a simple scheme commonly known as classical scaling or metric multi-dimensional scaling
(MDS) [13, 19]. Given the Euclidean distance matrix DE, the objective here is to find K vectors,
{y1, · · · ,yK} such that
DE(i, j) = (yi−yj)T (yi−yj) (5.1)
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Note that the above configuration points yi’s are not unique. Any translation or rotation of vectors yi’s
can also be a solution to Eqn. 5.1. To reduce such degrees of freedom of the solution set, we constrain
the solution set of vectors to be centered at the origin and the sum of the vectors to zero, i.e. ∑i yi = 0.
The next task is to find a set of vectors, such that YT Y = B, where B is the dot product dis-
tances derived from the monotonically increasing transformation of the distances computed by the
face recognition algorithm being modeled. One such solution strategy is to use the eigenvalue decom-
position (EVD) of B. Since B is a symmetric, positive semi-definite matrix, (assuming the rank of B
is M ≤ N). B has M non-negative eigenvalues and N−M zero eigenvalues.
B = VEVD∆EVDVEVDT (5.2)
where ∆EVD is a N ×N diagonal matrices where first M diagonal entries represents the non-zero
eigenvalues of matrix B sorted in ascending order. VEVD represents the corresponding eigenvectors
of B. The solution is then given by
Y = (VMEVD∆
M
EVD
1
2 )T (5.3)
where ∆MEVD is a M ×M diagonal matrices consisting of M non-zero eigenvalues of B and VMEVD
represents the corresponding eigenvectors of B.
Now, following the similar discussion as presented in Chapter 3, we can derive the affine trans-
formation A as a composition of two sub-transformations: non-rigid transformation Anr and rigid
transformation rigid, Ar, i.e., A = AnrAr. The rigid part Ar can be arrived at by any analysis that
computes an orthonormal subspace from the given set of training images. In this experiment, we use
principal component analysis (PCA) for the rigid transformation. Let the PCA co-ordinates corre-
sponding to the non-zero eigenvalues, i.e. non-null subspace, be denoted by Xr = Ar(X− µ)). The
non-rigid transformation, Anr, relates these rigid co-ordinates, Xr to the distance based co-ordinates,
Y and can be expressed as
Anr = (VMEVD ∆
M
EVD
1
2 )T XrT ΛPCA−1 (5.4)
This non-rigid transformation, allowing for shear and stress, and the rigid transformation, computed
by principal component analysis, together model the face recognition algorithm. Note that the rigid
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transformation is not dependent on the face recognition algorithm; it is only the non-rigid part that is
determined by the distances computed by the recognition algorithm. An alternative viewpoint could
be that the non-rigid transformation captures the difference between a PCA based recognition strategy
– the baseline – and the given face recognition algorithm.
5.2 Embedding and Reconstruction
For the break-in scenario, we will not have access to the target image; however, we will be able
to retrieve distances of the target image to any given image. So, we need a mechanism to be able to
compute co-ordinates of the target image from the given distances, i.e. embed the target image in the
modeling affine space. Given the embedded co-ordinates, we will use the inverse transformation to
reconstruct the target image. In this section, we explain the embedding solution outlined in Fig. 5.2.
Figure 5.2 Block Diagram of Embedding Scheme.
Figure 5.3 Block Diagram of Reconstruction Scheme.
Let, yz be the unknown target template coordinate vector in affine space. Let d = [ ˆd1, ˆd2, · · · , ˆdK ]T be
the vector of distances of yz from the K images Y = [y1, · · · ,yK] in the break-in set as computed by
the face recognition algorithm along with the Euclidean correction factor that was found during esti-
mation of the recognition algorithm. Based on the nature of the construction of the affine space, these
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distances would be equal to the Euclidean distance between the vectors yz and yi. Mathematically,
ˆd2i = ‖yi−yz‖2 = ‖yi‖2 +‖yz‖2−2yiT yz, ∀i = 1, · · · ,K (5.5)
subtracting ˆd2i from ˆd(i+1)2 and simplifying, we have
Eyz = F ⇒ yz = E†F (5.6)
where,
ET =
[
(y2−y1)T ,(y3−y2)T , · · · ,(yK−yK−1)T
] (5.7)
FT = [ fi] , fi = 12 [(
ˆd2i −‖yi‖2)− ( ˆd2i+1−‖yi+1‖2)] (5.8)
and E† represents the pseudo-inverse of E. Here, we assume that E does not map all points to null
space of F hence pseudo-inverse of E exists. Thus, given distances ˆd = [ ˆd1, ˆd2, · · · , ˆdK ] of any un-
known template yz from K images in the break-in set, we can use Eqn. 5.6 to compute the co-ordinates
of yz in the approximating affine space.
Once we obtain the co-ordinate of any unknown template in affine space, we invert the transfor-
mation to reconstruct the template. Mathematically, if yz is the embedding coordinate of unknown
template xz, then
AnrArxz = yz ⇒ xz = ATr A
†
nryz (5.9)
In summary, the individual steps involved in reconstructing target templates are as follows:
Inputs
• Knowledge of the face recognition algorithm
• A set of K face images (break-in set)
• A set of match scores between the templates from break-in set to the assumed identity’s template
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Modeling
• Compute distance matrix D between these K templates using the underlying face recognition
algorithm.
• If D is not Euclidean, then compute the equivalent Euclidean distance matrix DE
• Calculate XEVD from DE
– Construct the matrix B by double centering with H. This step centers the given distance
and convert them into equivalent dot product distances B =− 12 HDH
– Compute the EVD of B as B = VEVD∆EVDVEVDT
– Compute co-ordinates Y as Y = (VMEVD∆MEVD
1
2 )T
• Build the affine transformation A = AnrAr
– The rigid part Ar of affine transformation can be arrived at by PCA. Let the PCA co-
ordinates be denoted by Xr = ArX. The non-rigid part Anr of the transformation is given
by,
Anr = (VMEVD ∆
M
EVD
1
2 )T XrT ΛPCA−1
where ΛPCA is the diagonal matrix with the PCA eigenvalues
Embedding and Reconstruction
• Find the MDS co-ordinate yz of target template xz
– Compare the templates in break-in set with target template to create distances vector ˆd
– The coordinate of the target template yz in MDS space is constructed as yz = E† ·F
• Reconstruct the the unknown template xz using Eqn. 5.9
5.3 Experimental Setup
We demonstrate our reconstruction scheme using three, fundamentally different, face recognition
algorithms: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) with the Mahalanobis cosine distance measure,
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the Bayesian Intra/Extra-class person classifier (BAY), and a feature based commercial algorithm. In
order to emphasize the true independence of the break-in set and gallery set, we use two distinct public
databases. The FERET [40] database is used for the gallery images and the Face Recognition Grand
Challenge (FRGC) database [41] is used to construct different break-in sets. In this section, we first
provide an overview of two databases and face recognition algorithms used in our experiments. Then
we present the reconstructed templates and corresponding break-in performance for each of the face
recognition algorithms. Later, we compare our approach with hill climbing based attacks and show
the efficiency of our proposed method over a hill climbing based approach [1] both in terms of quality
of reconstructed templates and break-in performances. Finally, we demonstrate the robustness of our
proposed algorithm to score quantization.
(a) Sample images from break-in set
(b) Sample images from gallery set
Figure 5.4 Sample Images from (a) Break-in Set and (b) Gallery Set. Break-in Set and Gallery Set are
Independent of Each Other and have No Subjects in Common.
5.3.1 Database
The face images used in this experiment are selected from the FERET [40] and Face Recognition
Grand Challenge (FRGC) face databases [41]. To ensure the distinctiveness of the break-in set with
the gallery set, we choose our break-in set from a subset of the FRGC training set and reconstructed all
the images from the FERET gallery set containing 1196 images from 1196 subjects. The FERET face
database is a widely used public database, and the gallery set is pre-defined (feret gallery.srt in [8])
in that database. We use Colorado State University (CSU) Face Identification Evaluation System to
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normalize the original face images [8]. The normalized face images have the same eye location, the
same size (150 x 130), and similar intensity distribution. Few pre-processed face images are shown in
Fig. 5.4. For break-in sets, we selected a subset of the FRGC training set with 600 controlled images
from the first 150 subjects (in the increasing order of their numeric id) with 4 images per subject.
In order to validate the effectiveness of the proposed template reconstruction scheme and break-in
strategy, it is necessary that the selected face recognition algorithms have high recognition rates at
low false acceptance rates (FAR). Since most of the face recognition algorithms perform poorly on
a data set with one or more variations in face images [41], we restrict our experiments to controlled
frontal face images only. Similarly, current template based algorithms require the images to be scaled
to the same size with the same eye location, so a pre-processing step is inevitable for such algorithms.
However, if a face recognition system has high performance without such restriction on the variation
of face images or size of the face images then the proposed scheme can be extended naturally to such
systems.
5.3.2 Face Recognition Algorithms
We evaluate the proposed reconstruction scheme on two template based algorithms and one fea-
ture based face recognition system: Principal Component Analysis approach with Mahalanobis cosine
angle as the distance measure which by default is considered as the baseline algorithm for face recog-
nition system [59], Moghaddam and Pentland’s algorithm popularly known as Bayesian Intra/Extra-
class person classifier [31], and a commercial face recognition system. The commercial system is
based on Local Feature Analysis of face images and widely regarded as being among the best avail-
able at present. Both baseline and BAY algorithms were trained using the break-in set from the FRGC
training set but the commercial algorithm did not require any training process and used as a black box
in all of our experiments. Since all the face images are normalized with fixed eye co-ordinates () and
fixed size (150 x 130) face images, we did not utilize the face and eye detector module embedded in
the commercial face recognition system. Using fafb probe set of the FERET data set, we observe that
the baseline, BAY and the commercial algorithm have 97%, 95% and 99% true acceptance rate at 1%
false acceptance rate (FAR) respectively on the fafb probe set in the FERET database.
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5.3.3 Distance Measure
The three algorithms used in this experiment have completely different approaches of comparing
two faces and generate similarity and/or dissimilarity scores with different distance measures. The
baseline algorithm uses Mahalanobis cosine angle and has dissimilarity scores between -1 to 1. Simi-
larly, the Bayesian maximum likelihood classifier reports the similarity between two faces in terms of
probability of difference image to the intrapersonal/extrapersonal space. For this experiment, we use
CSU implementation of the BAY algorithm [8] where a negative logarithm transformation is applied
to the probabilistic similarity score to convert them into a distance measure [12]. However, in order
to have an upper bound for the dissimilarity scores, we row normalize the distances to the interval [0
1]. The similarity measure used in feature based commercial algorithm is not known, but the sim-
ilarity scores are within a finite range of [Smin Smax]. We convert similarity scores to distances by
simply subtracting each match score Si j from the maximum possible match score (Smax− Smin). We
observe that all the three distance measures used by respective algorithms exhibit symmetric property
but violate the triangle inequality property. Hence, we reinforce the triangle inequality property in
the respective distance matrices. The values of ς learned from the break-in set are 1.297, 2.094 and
19.970 for the baseline, BAY and the commercial algorithms, respectively.
5.4 Results
Our first objective is to model the behavior of each face recognition algorithm in terms of an affine
transformation. In other words, the distance between two templates computed by these algorithms
should be close to the Euclidean distance between the two templates in the respective affine spaces.
Here, we present some of the intermediate results showing the accuracy of our modeling scheme and
the behavior of the constructed affine spaces.
In Fig. 5.5, we plot the eigenvalues of the transformed distance matrices B defined in Eqn. 3.14.
The eigenvalues of the individual algorithms reflect the nature of the affine space for each individual
algorithm. The plots for eigenvalues of the three distance matrices from three algorithms appear
different due to different scales of eigenvalues for each algorithm. In Fig. 5.5 (a), we can observe that
the eigenvalues drop from 9.4 to zero at 360 index of the eigenvector which is about 60% of the total
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Figure 5.5 The Eigenvalues of the B Matrix for Three Face Recognition Algorithms. (a) Baseline
Algorithm (b) BAY Algorithm (c) Commercial Algorithm.
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number of images. Thus, it can be inferred that the baseline algorithm uses top eigenvectors which
contribute 60% of the total energy. Moreover, Fig. 5.5 also provides estimation for the dimension of
each affine space. For example, we can expect that for the baseline algorithm any break-in set with
more than 360 images will result approximately the same probability of break-in. In other words, 360
images (attempts) are sufficient to achieve optimal break-in performance for the baseline algorithm.
However in the case of the BAY algorithm, it appears that eigenvalues do not drop to zero even with
600 images in break-in set. Hence we can expect the loss of sharp features in reconstructed images for
the BAY algorithm with 600 or less images in break-in set. Similarly for the commercial algorithm,
we can expect a near optimal performance with 600 images in break-in set.
To quantify the modeling error, we compute Euclidean distance between the projected images in
affine space and compare with the actual distance matrices computed by the respective algorithms
after correction of additive constant factor. The normalized error ε is then computed as follows.
ε =
˜di j−di j
di j
where, ˜di j represents Euclidean distance between projected images i and j in affine space and di j
represents the actual distance computed by recognition algorithm. We observe that, the mean of the
normalized errors ε are 0.002, 0.0457 and 0.1881 with standard deviations 0.1563, 0.0915 and 0.2554
for baseline, BAY and commercial algorithms, respectively.
5.4.1 Reconstructed Face Templates
To study the effect of the number of images in the break-in set against the quality of reconstructed
templates and break-in performances, we created five different break-in sets from the FRGC training
set. Two break-in sets contain 75 and 150 images with one image per subject and the other three
break-in sets contain 300, 450, and 600 images respectively with multiple images per subject. Sample
images from break-in set and gallery set are shown in Fig. 5.4. We reconstructed all the 1196 images
in the FERET gallery set using each of the five break-in sets. In Fig. 5.6 we present some of the
reconstructed images using a break-in set with 600 images. In Fig. 5.7 we show the reconstruction
templates of a particular target with all the five break-in sets. As expected, the reconstruction of the
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target template improves with the number of images in the break-in sets. The noise in the reconstructed
images is due to the fact that the break-in set and gallery set are from two distinct databases collected
in a totally different environment. In the case of the BAY algorithm, the reconstructed images appear
much smoother than the original image. As mentioned earlier, the BAY algorithm requires more than
600 numbers of images in break-in set for better reconstruction.
Figure 5.6 Reconstructed Face Templates Using a Break-in Set with 600 Images. First Row Repre-
sents the Original Templates; Second, Third and Fourth Rows Represent the Reconstructed Templates
for Baseline, BAY and Commercial Algorithm Respectively.
5.5 Discussion
In this Chapter, we proposed a novel paradigm to reconstruct face templates from match scores
using a linear approach. First we modeled the behavior of the given face recognition algorithm by an
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Original Reconstructed Templates75 150 300 450 600
Figure 5.7 Variation in Reconstructed Templates for Three Algorithms. Using Five Different Break-in
Sets with 75, 150, 300, 450 and 600 Images. First Column Represents the Original Target Template.
First, Second and Third Rows represent the reconstructed templates for Baseline, BAY and commer-
cial algorithm respectively.
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affine transformation. The goal of the modeling is to approximate the distances computed by a face
recognition algorithm between two faces by distances between points, representing these faces, in an
affine space. Given this space, templates from an independent image set (break-in) were matched
only once with the enrolled template of the targeted subject and match scores are recorded. These
scores were then used to embed the targeted subject in the approximating affine (non-orthogonal)
space. Given the co-ordinates of the targeted subject in the affine space, the original template of the
targeted subject was reconstructed using the inverse of the affine transformation. We demonstrated our
ideas using three, fundamentally different, face recognition algorithms: Principal Component Anal-
ysis (PCA) with Mahalanobis cosine distance measure, Bayesian Intra/Extra-class person classifier
(BAY), and a feature based commercial algorithm. To demonstrate the independence of the break-
in set with the gallery set, we select face templates from two different databases: Face Recognition
Grand Challenge (FRGC) and Facial Recognition Technology (FERET) Database (FERET). In this
Chapter we presented a qualitative comparison of reconstructed face templates with original face tem-
plates. How good are these reconstructed face templates compare to original templates? Can we use
these reconstructed face templates to grant access (unauthorized) to this system? Can a reconstructed
face template reveal the identity of person who has access to the system? We answer these security
and privacy related questions in the next Chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
PRIVACY AND SECURITY ISSUES RELATED TO FACE RECOGNITION SYSTEMS
The requirement of a robust, secured authentication system and the availability of the commercial
off the shelf (COTS) biometric based authentication system encourages the deployment of such sys-
tems in relatively low to very high risk secure facilities. At the same time incorporation of biometrics
in operational scenarios reveals several other issues related to security and privacy of the users. Re-
generation of enrolled gallery templates will reveal the identity of the persons with exclusive access
to highly secured areas or can be use to negate any classified operation such as monitoring certain
subjects in watch list. Also the templates can be re-used over digital networks or can be use to re-
produce synthetic biometric templates such as fake fingers or model faces [16, 54]. Since the cost
of replacing a biometric token or template is much higher compared to a password or smart card,
the unauthorized access or regeneration of biometric templates is a major issue in biometric applica-
tions [22, 42, 47]. The standardized biometric application programming interface (BioAPI) has been
continuously updated with novel guidelines such as encryption of templates, avoiding storage and
transmit of templates and quantization of match scores to neutralize such security breaches [9]. In
order to make biometric applications robust to such threats it is extremely necessary to point out vari-
ous ways by which the templates can be regenerated and propose different counter measures to such
attacks [3, 4, 15, 45]. Most biometric authentication systems have three major components: biometric
template acquisition sensor, modules to compare a new template to enrolled template(s) and a deci-
sion module with pre-defined thresholds for particular operational points [10]. In applications, where
matching module and decision module are not integrated together it is required to store the match
score in digital media or to transmit the match score through digital channel to decision module. Can
unauthorized access of these match scores result in security breaches? In this paper we demonstrate
that biometric templates can indeed be reconstructed from match scores using a non-iterative process.
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Methods that have been proposed to reconstruct the biometric templates from the match scores
are based on the hill climbing techniques. Soutar [52] proposed an iterative template reconstruction
scheme popularly known as the hill climbing attack. This scheme selects the account of a specific sub-
ject referred to as target by starting with an arbitrary face template and iteratively refining it. At each
iteration, if the current match score is better than the previous match score then the modified template
is retained else it is discarded. The process is iterated until the template is accepted as the target sub-
ject. Though Soutar did not report any quantitative results of biometric template reconstruction, the
performance of similar approaches has been reported by several others [1, 60]. In Chapter 2, we have
discussed other hacking methods for different biometric modalities and presented a short comparison
of our proposed template reconstruction scheme and break-in method with a general hill climbing ap-
proach. Hill climbing based attacks can successfully break a particular target account by regenerating
the target template, this type of attacks have other drawbacks. Hill climbing based attacks requires
significant number of attempts before success. Besides, each of these attempts use incrementally dif-
ferent faces. These two properties can be used together to block hill climbing attack. Following the
template reconstruction method proposed in last Chapter, in this Chapter, we present a quantitative
analysis of reconstructed face templates and also compare the performance of our break-in approach
with one of the hill climbing based attacks.
To measure the strength of the proposed hack, we define a strong metric called probability of
break-in and use this metric to evaluate our scheme with a hill climbing based attack at fixed False
Acceptance Rate (FAR). With an operational point set at 1% FAR and 99% True Acceptance Rate
(TAR) for 1196 enrollments (FERET gallery), we demonstrate that at most 600 attempts (score com-
putations) are required to achieve a 73% chance of breaking in as a randomly chosen target subject
for the commercial face recognition system. With similar operational set up, we achieve a 72% and
100% chance of breaking in for the BAY and PCA based face recognition systems, respectively. With
three different levels of score quantization, we achieve 69%, 68% and 49% probability of break-in,
indicating the robustness of our proposed scheme to score quantization. We also show that the pro-
posed reconstruction scheme has 47% more probability of breaking in as a randomly chosen target
subject for the commercial system as compared to a hill climbing approach with the same number
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of attempts. Given that the proposed template reconstruction method uses distinct face templates to
reconstruct faces, this work exposes a more severe form of vulnerability than a hill climbing kind
of attack where incrementally different versions of the same face are used. Also, the ability of the
proposed approach to reconstruct actual face templates of the users increases privacy concerns in
biometric systems.
6.1 Probability of Break-in
Figure 6.1 Probability of Break-in Using the Reconstructed Face Template.
To quantify the performance of breaking into a system with reconstructed images, we compute
the probability of break-in, which is defined as the probability of breaking a randomly chosen targeted
subject.
Prob. of break-in = No. of successfully verified targeted subject using reconstructed images
Total no. of enrolled subjects (6.1)
The reconstructed templates of the targeted subject are matched against the original templates of the
targeted subject and a dissimilarity matrix is generated for each of the three algorithms. From each
of these dissimilarity matrices, we compute the True Acceptance Rate (TAR) at 1% False Acceptance
Rate (FAR) from the respective Receiver Operating Characteristic Curves (ROC). The probability of
breaking into any particular face recognition system is computed as the ratio between the number of
accounts successfully broken at 1% FAR and the total number of accounts.
Note that this performance measure for break-in is different from that used in other related works
[27, 60], where the number of attempts is considered as a measure of the breaking into a security
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Figure 6.2 Probability of Break-in Using Five Different Break-in Sets for Three Algorithms at 1%
FAR on the FERET Gallery Set.
system. In our case, the number of attempts is fixed and same as the number of images in break-in
set. In Fig. 6.2 we demonstrate the trade-off between probabilities of break-in for the system with
the number of attempts which is same as the number of images in break-in set. For the baseline
algorithm, only 300 attempts is sufficient to achieve a 100% success rate to break into the system. For
the feature based commercial algorithm, 600 numbers of attempts are needed to break into the system
with a probability of 0.73. For the template based BAY algorithm, 600 attempts are required to break
into the system with a probability of 0.72. Note that at 1% FAR, the probability of break-in with any
random template after 600 attempts is 0.01.
6.2 Comparison with Hill Climbing Approach
In this section, we compare our proposed template reconstruction scheme with a hill climbing
based approach [1,60] on the commercial face recognition system. The Eigenfaces required to modify
the previous template in a hill climbing approach are created using 600 images from the break-in set.
At each iteration, a randomly selected Eigenface is added or subtracted from the previous template.
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Due to the computational demand of the hill climbing process, we restrict our version of the hill
climbing method to the first 100 subjects of the FERET gallery set, and a maximum of 600 attempts
are allowed per subject. The commercial algorithm is set to operate at 1% FAR with 99% TAR, and
we let the system decide the acceptance or rejection of a probe template based on this operational set-
up. We count the number of target accounts that are successfully broken by hill climbing method and
compare that with the number of successfully accepted reconstructed templates, using our break-in
set with 600 images. It should be noted that, once we reconstruct a target face template, we treat the
reconstructed template as an original face template and match with gallery set. This comparison shows
the efficiency of our approach against the hill climbing approach after 600 iterations. In Table 6.1,
we present a few reconstructed templates from hill climbing approach at 300 and 600 iterations and
the corresponding reconstructed templates with our approach using the same number of comparisons.
In first column of Table 6.1, we show three different accounts enrolled with target templates marked
Figure 6.3 Comparison of Probability of Break-in at 1% FAR for Commercial Algorithm. We use First
100 Subjects of the FERET Gallery Set. The Commercial Algorithm is Set to Operate at a Pre-defined
Threshold such that TAR = 99% at 1% FAR.
as easy, moderate, and hard accounts to break in. The first row of Table 6.1 represents a target
template (easy) whose account is broken by both hill climbing approach and our approach as well.
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However, it should be noted that hill climbing approach requires 600 attempts to break into this easy
account whereas the same result can be achieved with only 300 iterations using our proposed scheme.
Similarly, in the second row of Table 6.1, we present a target template (moderate) whose account
cannot be broken by the hill climbing approach after 600 attempts but proposed scheme successfully
broke that account with 600 attempts. Finally, in the third row we present a target template (hard)
whose account can not be hacked by either scheme.
In Fig. 6.3, we compare overall break-in performance of both the schemes using the first 100
subjects from the FERET gallery set. We can observe that the proposed scheme has a 47% higher
chance of break into a random account compared to the hill climbing attack with 600 attempts. It
is worth to mention here that in [1], Adler shows that this particular hill climbing based approach
requires approximately 3000 to 4000 iterations to successfully break an account which is much higher
compared to the 600 iterations we used here. This count does not include the comparisons needed
during the modeling procedure, which is done off-line.
6.3 Effect of Score Quantization
One counter-measure for the first generation hill climbing attack is to quantize match scores. The
systems with quantized match scores do not alter the output match scores with small changes in input
images, which can prevent general hill climbing attacks. In such cases, if two similar probe templates,
when matched with a target template, have the original match scores, say, 42.56 and 43.4 in the
range 0 to 100, and if the system quantizes the output match scores to the nearest integer (round-
off), then both the scores will be quantized to 43. For such type of quantized scores, a hill climbing
based approach will fail to observe the improvement in modified template and will fail to regenerate
a template for the next iteration. However, such quantization of match scores has minimal effect on
the proposed break-in scheme. Though, in [2] Adler proposed a modified hill climbing approach for
systems with quantized match scores, our version of the hill climbing approach failed with quantized
match scores and therefore, we did not compare the break-in performance of hill climbing approach
with our approach on quantized match scores. In our proposed scheme, we compare different face
templates to target templates and do not need to observe any improvement in match scores; hence the
82
proposed scheme is robust to the system with quantized match scores. In this experiment, we compute
Figure 6.4 Probability of Break-in at 1% FAR for Commercial Algorithm with Quantized Scores.
The Value of Quantization Parameter ∆S in Eqn. 6.3 is Set to 0.001, 0.01, 0.1 and 1 to Quantize the
Original Match Score at Four Different Levels.
the probability of break-in using quantized match scores for the commercial face recognition system.
We define a quantization index Qs which controls the level of quantization.
Squant =
⌊Sorig−Smin
∆S
⌋
·∆S +Smin (6.2)
Qs = ∆S
(Smax−Smin)
where Sorig, Squant , Smax and Smin represents the original, quantized, the minimum and the maximum
match score of the recognition system, respectively. In Eqn. 6.3, the parameter ∆S controls the level
of the quantization of original scores and is defined as the length of the quantized intervals i.e. the
difference between two successive quantized scores. To be consistent with variable range of match
scores for different algorithms, we define quantization index Qs by normalizing ∆S over a possible
range of match scores of a recognition system. If the quantization index is set to 0.1, then origi-
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nal scores are quantized at 10 different points and if Qs equals to 0.01 then the original scores are
quantized at 100 different points. For this experiment, we use four different levels of quantization by
setting the value of Qs to 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01 and 0.1 respectively. Fig. 6.4 shows the probability of
break-in at 1% FAR for the commercial algorithm with proposed quantization of match scores. We
observe that probabilities of break-in do not change significantly when original scores quantized with
Qs equals to 0.0001 or 0.001 and probability of break-in drops from 0.68 to 0.45 when Qs equals to
0.01. However, we can observe that, for Qs equal to 0.1, the probability of break-in dropped from 0.45
to 0.22. In Table 6.2, we demonstrate the effect of quantization on a reconstructed template along with
the acceptance/rejection decision from the system using that particular reconstructed template. As we
can observe, with increasing value of Qs, the quality of the reconstructed template starts to degrade
and is eventually rejected by the system. If the system outputs very high level of quantized scores
e.g with Qs = 0.1 then the original match scores are highly distorted and the affine modeling of the
underlying algorithm is erroneous and as a result, overall break-in performance is affected. However,
it should be observed that such quantization of match scores has a trade-off with the operational flexi-
bility of a system. For example, if the recognition system, with range of original scores in the interval
[0 100], quantizes the original scores at 10 different points with Qs equal to 0.1 (i.e. output scores as
a multiplier of 10), then the system is restricted to operate only at these 10 distinct operational points
(thresholds) and loose the flexibility to operate at any intermediate threshold or FARs.
Table 6.2 Effect of Quantization of Match Scores on Reconstructed Templates.
Target Face Quantization Index Qs
0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.1
Accept Accept Reject Reject
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6.4 Discussion
We present a novel scheme to reconstruct face images from match scores. We use an affine trans-
formation to approximate the behavior of the face recognition system using an independent set of face
templates termed as break-in set. Selected subsets of templates in the break-in set are then matched
only once with the enrolled templates of the target account and match scores are noted. Given the
distances of the target template we embed the target in the learnt affine space and invert the modeling
affine transformation to arrive at the original template. We observed that with the proposed scheme,
at most 450 attempts are required to achieve a 0.93 probability of breaking into a commercial face
recognition algorithm. The major advantage of the proposed scheme over hill climbing attack is its
non-iterative and the number of attempts is less. This scheme also uses distinct templates in each at-
tempt when compared to the target template. Therefore such attack is difficult to detect automatically
and can not be neutralized by simple quantization of match scores. With the proposed scheme we
exploit a serious security breach in biometric authentication system using only match scores. On the
surface, match scores from a biometric system may not appear to be a weak link in terms of security
and privacy issues. However in this experiment we reveal that even match scores carries sufficient
information for reconstruction of the original templates and should be protected in the same way as
original templates. Therefore guidelines such as encryption of match scores, limited number of at-
tempts within a fixed time interval, periodical updates of enrolled templates etc should be incorporated
with every installation of biometric authentication system.
With the proposed scheme, we exposed a serious security breach using match scores of the face
recognition systems. A cursory look at match scores from a biometric system may not appear to be
a weak link in terms of security and privacy issues, however, in this experiment, we revealed that
even match scores carry sufficient information for reverse engineering of the original templates and
should be protected in the same way as the original templates. The major advantage of the proposed
scheme over earlier proposed hill climbing attack is that it is not based on local search, and number
of attempts are less. Our scheme also uses distinct templates in each attempt when compared to a
target template. Therefore such attack is difficult to detect automatically and can not be neutralized
by simple quantization of match scores. Thus, future face recognition systems should emphasize
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issues related to privacy of the face template and system robustness to such types of attacks. Recently,
few interesting developments towards encryption of face templates such as cancelable biometrics [45]
and revocable biometrics [15] have been proposed. However, in this paper, we have not addressed
such encrypted systems; in the future, the proposed template reconstruction scheme can be explored
further to deal with encrypted systems. Nevertheless, the template encryption and re-distribution of
match scores are progressive directions to address issues related to template securities in biometric
applications.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a novel, linear modeling scheme for different face recognition algorithms based on
the match scores. Starting with distance matrix representing the pairwise match scores between face
images, we used iterative stress minimization algorithm to obtain an embedding of distance matrix in
a low dimensional space. We then proposed a novel linear out-of-sample projection scheme for test
images. The linear transformation used to project new face images into the model space, is divided
into two sub transformation: a rigid transformation of face images obtained through principal compo-
nent analysis of face images followed by a non-rigid transformation responsible to preserve pair-wise
distance relationship between face images. To validate proposed modeling scheme, we used six fun-
damentally different face recognition algorithms, covering both template based and feature based
approaches, on four different probe sets using the FERET face image database. We compared the
recognition rate of each of the algorithms with respective model and demonstrated that the recogni-
tion rates are consistent on each of the probe set. Experimental results showed that the proposed linear
modeling scheme generalized to different probe set representing different variations in face images
(FERET probe sets) and consistent with performances of face recognition algorithms on large scale
data sets (FRGC Experiments). A 6.3% average Error in Modeling for six algorithms is observed at
0.001 False Acceptance Rate (FAR), for the FERET fafb probe set which contains maximum number
of subjects among all the probe sets. Similarly, for the FRGC experiments, we observed an average
of 3.5% Error in Modeling for the commercial algorithm at 0.001 FAR. The propose linear model
also exhibited an average of 87% accuracy when measured for the similar neighborhood relationship
with the original algorithms. We also demonstrated the usefulness of such modeling scheme on algo-
rithm specific indexing of face databases. Although choice of distance measure vary from algorithm
to algorithm, we showed that such variations in distance measures have less impact on our proposed
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modeling scheme. Similarly, many biometric systems uses score normalization as a post process-
ing routine and we observed that similar score normalization routine when applied to match scores
obtained through the affine model of the algorithm yields expected recognition performances.
We discussed a novel scheme to reconstruct face images from match scores and exploit a security
breach in the face recognition systems. We observed that with the proposed scheme, only 300 attempts
were required to achieve a 100% probability of breaking into the baseline face recognition algorithm
and 600 attempts were required for the BAY algorithm to achieve 72% success. For commercial al-
gorithm, we achieved 73% success rate to break into the system with 600 attempts. This observation
leads us to investigate further on easiness/hardness property of a particular target face. In Fig. 7.1,
we presented few target images which were hard to break with 600 number of attempts as well as we
showed few target images which were easy to break with only 75 attempts. It will be interesting to
investigate further on the hardness/easiness of a particular target face and the abilities to quantize any
target face in terms of a hard/easy template to be used to sneak into a system. The break-in set chosen
for the proposed scheme was selected from the FRGC database and target templates were selected
from the FERET gallery set. These two databases were collected independently without any overlap
of subjects or equipments. However, for both the gallery set and break-in set, we used indoor con-
trolled images with neutral expression and controlled illumination. The results indicate that inclusion
of multiple images per subject yields better accuracy for template reconstruction. In particular, we
observed that, the break-in performance with the based recognition system improves with the break-in
set containing more than one image from subjects. With three different levels of score quantization,
we achieved 69%, 68%, and 49% of probability of break-in, respectively, indicating the robustness of
the proposed scheme to score quantization. We also showed that, the proposed reconstruction scheme
has 47% more probability of breaking in as a randomly chosen target template for the commercial
system as compare to a hill climbing based approach with 600 attempts.
7.1 Future Work
Although distance based learning approach such as multi-dimensional scaling is an established
theory in statistics, human perception and manifold learning, the exploration of such methodologies
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(a)
(b)
Figure 7.1 Easy/Difficult Face Images for Commercial Algorithm (a) Sample of Difficult Target Im-
ages which Can Not be Broken with 600 Attempts (b) Sample of Easy Target Images which Can be
Broken with Only 75 Attempts
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to biometric distances are novel ideas in this proposal along with the construction of linear models
to face recognition algorithms. Off-line performance analysis of any face recognition system with-
out decoding details of the algorithm design, indexing of face databases, impact of face template
reconstruction on system security and user’s privacy are few other directions which are new and has
significant impact on biometric applications. The major contribution of this dissertation is attributed
to the affine modeling of a face recognition algorithm from the distance matrix. The solution strat-
egy that we have outlined from distances to co-ordinates is adopted from classical multi-dimensional
scaling (MDS) [13, 19] as well as stress minimization using iterative majorization techniques. The
goal of MDS is to find a low dimensional placement of a given set of points, which would approxi-
mate distances between them in a higher dimensional space. It is essentially an unsupervised learning
method for the metric embedded in the given data set or in this particular case associated with an
unknown algorithm. MDS based embedding are useful in application such as clustering and pattern
classification where a pre-defined metric or (di)similarity measure may not achieve the desired accu-
racy. In our scheme we use this embedding to model a recognition algorithm and convert the unknown
distance measure to an equivalent Euclidean distance measure in lower dimensional space. Wang et
al. [63] extended the similar embedding technique to distance based queries on a high dimensional
database where the distance measure is pre-defined, and the low dimensional projected space is re-
stricted to be orthogonal. In [68], a distance metric learning method is proposed that learns a distance
metric preserving the similarity/dissimilarity (binary 0 or 1) relationship between a set of points. The
method is based on posing distance metric learning problem as a convex optimization problem. A
distance metric learning algorithm with kernels was proposed in [57, 69] describing a feature weight-
ing method that works in the input space as well as in the kernel space. Basically, it performs a non
parametric kernel adaptation. The distance learning method described in [51] learns by relative com-
parisons, which is a flexible way for describing qualitative training data as a set of constraints. These
constraints lead to a convex quadratic programming problem solved by adapting standard methods
for Support Vector Machine (SVM) training. It can process a distance metric from qualitative and
relative examples. Future research could determine if any of these methods can be used to learn dis-
tance function based solely on match and non-match biometric examples. Other than MDS, there
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are other linear and non-linear approaches such as Locally Linear Embedding (LLE), ISOMAP and
non-linear manifold learning methods that rely on embedding general metric and non-metric spaces
into low dimensional Euclidean spaces. The Isomap [56] and LLE [49] algorithms use a collection
of local neighborhoods or exploit the spectral properties of adjacency graphs from which the global
geometry of the manifold is reconstructed. The distributional scaling method presented in [43] de-
scribes a method for embedding metric as well as non metric spaces in low dimensional Euclidean
spaces. Based on semi-definite programming, a new method for dimensionality reduction or learning
underlying manifolds was proposed by Weinberger and Saul [66]. It combines the concepts of semi-
definite programming for learning kernel matrices with spectral methods of non linear dimensionality
reduction. We presently have very encouraging results with the simplest form of embedding, i.e. clas-
sical MDS; however, in our future research we can consider the possibility of learning transformations
to directly map any unseen image to these non-linear manifolds. For the reconstruction of original
biometric templates from lower dimensional co-ordinates, we could explore the use of pseudo-inverse
of approximated affine transform. We would also like to explore various inverse scaling methods to
reconstruct the original co-ordinates from lower dimensional vectors.
With the help of the proposed modeling scheme, future research will explore the possibility of
finding optimal performance of any face recognition algorithm with respect to a given training set.
Also, instead of classical scaling other possible choices to arrive at the MDS co-ordinates include
metric least-square scaling that allows for metric transformations of the given dissimilarities so as to
minimize a given loss-function, capturing the differences, maybe weighted, between the transformed
dissimilarities and the distances in the embedded space. Note that metric in metric scaling refers to
the transformation and not the point configuration space. In non-metric scaling, arbitrary, monotonic,
transformations are allowed as long as rank orders are preserved. These could be focus of future work.
However, as we have seen in this work the stress minimization along with the classical MDS suffices
for modeling most face recognition algorithms. There is also the danger that complicated schemes
might over-fit to the given distances.
Although we have demonstrated the accuracy of the linear model on different face recognition
algorithms, we are also interested to extend the proposed linear modeling scheme to the human face
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recognition process. Recently O’Toole et al. [36] compared and analyzed the performance of face
recognition systems against human ability to recognize similar face images. A successful linear model
to the human performances will provide more in depth comparison of a person’s ability to recognize
face images with that of the face recognition algorithms. Also, the modeling and analyzing algorithms
using linear models, is not limited to face recognition algorithms, or in general, to any other biometric
modalities. The proposed learning approach can also be extended to the object recognition process,
as well as local manifold exploration of any classification problems. A closer look at our modeling
scheme will reveal that, the proposed modeling approach is in fact a systematic approach to approx-
imate the global manifold of face images as observed by the face recognition algorithms. Hence, in
case of object classifiers, we can extend the proposed work to approximate any manifold with a cas-
cade of linear models which will be an equivalent procedure to the piecewise linear approximation of
the manifold. At present, the distance based learning approach is limited to the distances between ob-
jects in spatial domains, however, the learning approach can also be extended to incorporate temporal
information and can be useful to analyze algorithm for video processing.
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